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INTRODUCTION
The rapid globalization of the economic marketplace has spurred
a proliferation of international lawmaking with respect to intellectual
property rights. Harmonization of laws has been called the "domi-
nant impulse" for such international lawmaking initiatives. This
trend is clearly visible in the world of trademark law.
Trademarks perform specialized functions in the world of intellec-
tual property. Traditionally, they are understood to identify the origin
of a product.2 With the increasing use of advertising and the growth
of a consumer society, trademarks have gradually come to be under-
stood as marks that serve to aid consumers with product differentia-
tion, evaluation of product quality, and brand identification.3 The
t A.B. 1996, Bowdoin College;J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Pennsylvania.
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I Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Essay: The Integration of International and Domestic Intellec-
tual Propery Lawmaking, 23 COL.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 305, 308 (1999). In fact, it has been
said that the "harmonization and unification of law generally has been an aspiration of
the international legal community since the fall of the Roman Empire." Spencer
Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Anti-
trust, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 557,558 n.1 (1994).
2 See Annett Wagner, Infringing Trade Marks: Function, Association and Confusion of
Signs According to theE.C. Trade Marks Directive, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 127, 127-28
(1999) (describing the concepts underlying trademark initiatives).
c See id. at 128 (outlining a multi-functional trademark concept). Wagner's article
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role of the trademark is becoming more important as goods increas-
ingly travel to distant markets where brand recognition may be the
consumer's only assurance of quality and origin. The harmonization
of international trademark law is a critical step in allowing trademarks
to serve their important role in the global economy, and such har-
monization could also serve as a stepping-stone toward the emergence
of a unitary transnational system of trademark protection.4
The harmonization of trademark law has largely been an effort to
escape the disjunction between the "dogmatic territoriality"5 underly-
ing the justification for the exercise of legislative and judicial power,
and the economic and practical realities of intellectual property law.6
Harmonization-by its very nature a process through which different
jurisdictional laws are reformed to more closely resemble an agreed
upon goal-fails, however, to escape the foundational role of territo-
riality in the enforcement of substantive trademark (and other intel-
lectual property) law. Following harmonization, the laws of the indi-
vidual nations are the only governing body of law,7 and protection of
contains a concise and helpful explanation of the different functions assumed by
trademarks in our modem consumer society.
4 Transnational here refers to those "norms and institutions which span, are valid
in, or apply to more than one country orjurisdiction." Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders:
On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 65, 66 (1996). Pro-
fessor Friedman believes that for a system to be described accurately as transnational, it
must have "the force of law, or the force of force, behind it." Id.
5 Territoriality holds two meanings with respect to trademark law. First, trademark
protection is "'determined by the national law of that country in which the trademark
owner seeks protection on the basis of registration or use,'" and it is "'that particular
national law which determines the requirements, the substance and the extent of pro-
tection.'" ReneJoliet, Trademark LicensingAgreements Under the EEC Law of Competition, 5
NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 755, 759 n.8 (1983-1984) (quoting F.K. Beier, Territoriality of
Trademark Law and International Trade, 1 1C INT'L INDUs. REV. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
48, 59 (1970)). Second, the protection of trademark rights is "'limited to the terri-
tory'" of the granting country, meaning that "'a domestic trademark cannot be in-
fringed by foreign acts nor can foreign trademarks be infringed by domestic acts.'" Id.
See Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of Intellectual Trademark Law, 2 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 9 (1998) (noting that "[d] ogmatic territoriality, when applied
to intellectual property, ignores basic reality because informational products cannot be
located at a particular spot on the globe"); Christopher A. Mohr, Comment, Gray Mar-
ket Goods and Copyright Law: An End Run Around K Mart v. Cartier, 45 CATH. U. L. REV.
561, 569 n.45 (1996) (noting that the "territoriality of trademark rights has also been
recognized as a matter of international law"); see also Laurinda L. Hicks & James R.
Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agree-
ments, 12 AMi. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 769, 770 (1997) ("As a result of the economic inte-
gration process and technological advancements, intellectual property rights are now
global commodities.").
7 See Andrea Morgan, Comment, TRIPS to Thailand: The Act for the Establishment of
and Procedurefor Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, 23 FORDHAM INT'L LJ.
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those rights in foreign countries "is only an extension of the domestic
right. ""
Although scholars have debated the role, wisdom, and future of
harmonization in the realm of international trademark law, the trend
toward such harmonization is undeniable.9 Progressive efforts at the
harmonization of international trademark law have been underway
for the past century, from the basic substantive and procedural inno-
vations of the Paris Convention in the 1880s to the fully harmonized
and unitary (if regional) trademark system introduced in the 1990s in
the European Union.
The purpose of this Comment is to trace briefly the developments
of the past century with respect to the harmonization of international
trademark law, to discuss their shortcomings, and then to focus on the
model of trademark protection developed in the European Union
(the Community Trade Mark System)."° This model has gone beyond
the harmonization of trademark laws and has established a unitary
trademark law governing the European Union. As such, it is a valu-
able model of the process and framework necessary for the creation of
a greater transnational system of trademark protection, and it should
be studied closely by those who envision the possibility of a unitary
worldwide system of trademark protection.
Part I of this Comment introduces and defines the concept of
harmonization and discusses the advantages as well as the inherent
limitations of harmonization efforts. Part II discusses several of the
principal international efforts at the harmonization of trademark pro-
tection. Part III explores the comprehensive development of the
harmonization of trademark law in the European Union. Part IV ex-
plains how the harmonization of trademark law in the European Un-
ion set the stage for the creation of a unitary trademark system in
795, 796 (2000) (noting that although intellectual property flows freely across borders,
there is no intellectual property law per se and intellectual property rights "vary ac-
cording to what each state recognizes and enforces").
XCarl Baudenbacher, Trademark Law and Parallel Imports in a Globalized World: Re-
cent Developments in Europe with Special Regard to the Legal Situation in the United States, 22
FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 645, 658 (1999).
C2ompare Leaffer, supra note 6, at 4 (suggesting that advances in harmonization
constitute evidence "that in some distant future, we may even see the eventual unifica-
tion of trademark law among nations"), with Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Harmonization:
Norms, Names & Nonsens4 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 33, 33 (1998) (arguing that
harmonization of trademark laws will not happen until international governments
abandon "territorial justifications for sovereignty and jurisdiction").
1" When I am referring specifically to the Community Trade Mark ("CTM"), I Will
follow the European convention by breaking "trademark" into two words: "trade
mark." Otherwise, I will follow the American convention of nomenclature.
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Europe. Part V concludes with suggestions as to how the Community
Trade Mark System can serve as a model for a unitary worldwide sys-
tem of trademark protection, noting that the CTM moves us closer to
a functional model of international trademark harmonization than
any other model. A continued study of the evolution and success of
the CTM will give trademark law scholars and practitioners valuable
insights as new proposals for more comprehensive international
trademark harmonization are put forth.
I. HARMONIZATION: A PROCESS WITH INHERENT LIMITATIONS
Harmonization is the process by which the varying laws of differ-
ent sovereign entities are changed to more closely reflect a common
set of legal principles agreed to by those sovereign entities." The "ra-
tionales of harmonization... are well known: efficiency, clarity, pre-
dictability."12 Harmonization should not be confused, however, with
international lawmaking, as it does not lead to a uniform set of agreed
rules, but rather merely "directs a change of rules, standards or proc-
esses in order to avoid conflicts and bring about equivalence.""
Therefore, the end product of harmonization is not a truly unitary
body of law that governs a particular subject matter over a number of
distinct jurisdictions. Instead, even after harmonization, the govern-
ing law in each jurisdiction is not the target set of legal principles, but
the revised national law of each local jurisdiction. All harmonization
can accomplish is the reformation of the individual jurisdictions' laws
so that the difference between the laws of the distinct jurisdictions is
smaller. Furthermore, the courts of the independent jurisdictions are
likely to interpret the changed national law not by the considerations
which led to the harmonization effort, but rather by the nuances and
traditions of that legal subject matter as they have evolved in that ju-
n Harmonization has been defined as:
a process in which diverse elements are combined or adapted to each other so
as to form a coherent whole while retaining their individuality. In its relative
sense, harmonization is the creation of a relationship between diverse things.
Its absolute and most common meaning, however, implies the creation of a
relationship of accord or consonance.
Waller, supra note 1, at 558 n.1 (quoting Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of
Laws, 39 AM.J. COMp. L. 699, 702 (1991)).
12 Larry Cata Backer, Harmonization, Subsidiarity and Cultural Difference: An Essay on
the Dynamics of Opposition Within Federative and International Legal Systems, 4 TULsA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 185,190 (1997).
13 George A. Zaphiriou, Unification and Harmonization of Law Relating to Global and
Regional Trading; 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 407,407 (1994).
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risdiction's particularjurisprudence.
This reality creates two inherent weaknesses and shortcomings in
harmonization efforts: (1) true uniformity of law is unlikely given the
varying political and legislative processes that each jurisdiction neces-
sarily undertakes in its attempt to reach the target goals of harmoniza-
tion; and (2) the interpretation and enforcement of the harmonized
laws of each jurisdiction will be governed by the law of each local gov-
ernment, invariably leading to inconsistencies in the meaning and ap-
plication of the law. In the end, harmonization does nothing to affect
the essence of territoriality-that the laws of each particular jurisdic-
tion determine the existence and enforcement of the legal rights for
that territory. Harmonization is an important trend, however, and it
has been an oft-utilized tool in creating trademark protection that can
better serve the needs of international trade.1
4
II. TRENDS IN HARMONIZATION: EFFORTS AT BASIC SUBSTANTIVE
AND PROCEDURAL HARMONIZATION OF
TRADEMARK REGISTRATION
Clearly, "[a] reliable, stable, and efficiently structured trademark
system benefits consumer and business interests alike.'15 It became
clear some time ago that the development of such a structured system
would have to take place, at least to some degree, on an international
level-especially given the increasingly international marketplace for
goods identified by trademarks. Several attempts have been made to
achieve some measure of harmonization that could provide greater
certainty and predictability in the realm of trademark protection for
those whose products cross national borders and for those who con-
sume those products.
A. The Paris Convention
The genesis of harmonization efforts in the realm of international
trademark law has its seeds in the nineteenth century. In 1883, with
the passage of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
1 It is clear that harmonization is, for the reasons stated, limited in its ability to
achieve uniformity and, therefore, to achieve the resulting benefits. The process of
harmonization could, however, be thought of as providing strengths vis-a-vis certain
other objectives. For example, a harmonized set of natural trademark laws, as opposed
to a unitary international law, would provide more room for cultural or natural differ-
ences with respect to certain key topics-such as differing notions of free expression.
15 Leaffer, supra note 6, at 5.
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Property,'6 "the first international effort to standardize and simplify
the protection of intellectual property rights in Member States" was
consummated.17  The Paris Convention approached the issue of
trademark protection through the application of two key principles:
the National Treatment Principle and the Principle of Independence
of Rights.
The first, the National Treatment Principle, holds that member
states should not be allowed to discriminate between their nationals
and the nationals of other member states in affording trademark pro-
tection. 18 The National Treatment Principle necessarily carries with it
the provision that a member state may refuse to extend or enforce
trademark rights protection "to citizens or corporations of states that
are not members of the Paris Convention." 9
The second principle, the Principle of Independence of Rights,
asserts that the trademark rights granted in one member state are in-
dependent of trademark rights in all other member states." Thus, a
trademark owner is "subject exclusively to the national law of each
country" that has granted trademark rights. 2' This limitation, that the
substantive law regulating the rights of trademark owners remains na-
tional, illustrates well the degree to which the principle of territoriality
is embedded in traditional notions of intellectual property law.
16 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature
Mar. 20, 1883, as amended at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1630, 828 U.N.T.S.
305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
17 Leaffer, supra note 6, at 9.
8 Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of indus-
trial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that
their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant to nationals; all without
prejudice to the rights specially provided for by this convention. Consequently,
they shall have the same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against
any infringement of their rights, provided that the conditions and formalities im-
posed upon nationals are complied with.
Paris Convention, supra note 16, art. 2, 21 U.S.T. at 1631, 828 U.N.T.S. at 313.
1 Joanna Schmidt-Szalewski, The International Protection of Trademarks After the TRIPS
Agreement 9 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 189, 193-94 (1998) (defining the National
Treatment Principle and noting that it "was the first elementary and efficient rule
aimed at facilitating the international protection" of trademark rights); see also INGA
GOVAERE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN E.C. LAW 31
("The principle of national treatment, which is often referred to as the cornerstone of
the intellectual property conventions, implies that the same intellectual property pro-
tection needs to be given to nationals of other contracting countries as to one's own
nationals.").
20 See GOVAERE, supra note 19, at 31 (defining the Principle of Independence of
Rights); Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 19, at 194-95 (same).
21 Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 19, at 194.
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The Paris Convention, however, does achieve some measure of
procedural harmonization in that it gives a right of priority "to trade-
mark registrants who have already registered their mark in another
member nation, because of that prior registration."22 It also provides
for the special protection of "well known" trademarks, in part by per-
mitting the registrant of a well known mark to institute cancellation
proceedings based on the validity of its earlier registration.23
Further, the Paris Convention provides a procedural framework
that dictates that an application for trademark protection cannot be
denied registration in a member nation "if a valid certificate of regis-
tration from another member nation is presented and certain criteria
are met."" The agreement also expressly "permits the conclusion of
special agreements between member states. Presently, four such spe-
cial agreements exist relating to trademarks: the Madrid Agree-
ment , ) the Trademark Registration Treaty,2 the Madrid Protoco
t 27 1
and the Trademark Law Treaty.2 81"2 Standing alone, however, the
Paris Convention achieved only a limited harmonization of interna-
tional trademark law because it left the implementation of its direc-
tives to be applied through the national laws of the member statesYo
The Paris Convention did not, indeed could not, create enforce-
able trademark rights distinct from the trademark rights of its individ-
ual member states. Thus, the Paris Convention clearly illustrates the
primary weakness of harmonization-its failure to overcome the prin-
ciple of territoriality. The agreement, however, did provide progress
toward the goal of harmonization by increasing the level of predict-
ability and certainty for trademark holders (and consumers) in the
22 Graziella M. Sarno, Comment, Vet Nam or Bust: Why Trademark Pirates Are Leav-
ing China for Better Opportunities in Viet Nam, 14 DIcL.J. INT'LL. 291,294 (1996).
21 Id. For a more detailed explanation of the Paris Convention's provisions for well
known marks, see Leaffer, supra note 6, at 10-11.
24 Sarno, supra note 22, at 294.
V. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14,
1891, as revisedJuly 14, 1967,828 U.N.T.S. 389 [hereinafter Madrid Agreement].
26 Trademark Registration Treaty, June 12, 1973, Hein's No. KAV 2310, 63
TRADEMARK REP. 640 (1973).
27 Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Regis-
tration of Marks, June 28, 1989, 28 INDus. PROP. L. & TREATIES 3-007, 001 (July-Aug.
1989).
2. Trademark Law Treaty, Oct. 27, 1994, 34 INDuS. PROP. L. & TREATIES 3-010, 001
(Jan. 1995).
Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 19, at 201. Together, these agreements along with
the Paris Convention are often referred to as the "Paris Union." See id.
See id. at 198-99 (noting that the Paris Convention's few rules relate merely to
the basic acquisition and content of a trademark right).
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realm of international trade.
B. The Madrid Agreemmt
The Madrid Agreement,"l which was completed at the Madrid Re-
vision conference of the Paris Convention in 1890 and later revised at
Stockholm in 1967, built upon the basic tenets of the Paris Conven-
tion. 32 The Madrid Agreement became part of the Paris Convention,
but only for countries that ratified the new treaty.8 The goal of the
Madrid Agreement was to provide for a "globally comprehensive in-
ternational registration system,"m and it sought to achieve this goal by
"afford[ing] trademark owners of Member States the opportunity to
obtain trademark rights in other countries through a single filing in
their home country's trademark office."35 Following such filing, the
application would be forwarded to the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") for registration and publication.m
The procedure implemented by the Madrid Agreement can be
summarized as follows: a holder of a national trademark in a member
state uses that valid trademark to apply for international trademark
registration with the International Bureau of the WIPO in Geneva; in
this application, the applicant lists the Madrid Agreement member
states in which protection is sought; then the WIPO distributes the in-
ternational application to the listed states, each of which treats the in-
ternational application as a national application;37 finally, unless one
of the "designated countr[ies] acts within one year to refuse protec-
tion, the mark is deemed protected."' Once the application has been
accepted, or the twelve-month refusal period has expired, the rights
31 Madrid Agreement, supra note 25.
32 See Leaffer, supra note 6, at 12 (tracing the history of the Madrid Agreement).
For a discussion about how the provisions of the Madrid Agreement interact with cur-
rent European trademark law, see G.F. Kuntz, The Madrid System and the Community
Trade Mark, in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TRADE MARK: COMMENTARY TO THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNrIY REGULATIONS 243 (Mario Franzosi ed., 1997).
33 Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 19, at 202.
s4 Leaffer, supra note 6, at 13.
3 Id. at 12.
36 See id. (describing WIPO's role in registering and publishing marks pursuant to
the Madrid Agreement).
37 This results in a situation where the mark may be "accepted in one country, ac-
cepted with reservations in another, and totally rejected in a third." Claire Burke, In-
ternational Intellectual Propety Conventions. A Tabular Guide, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv.
477,477 (1995).
Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, The Changing Landscape of International
Trademark Law, 27 GEO. WASH.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 433, 442 (1993-1994).
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bestowed by the trademark are determined and defined by the na-
tional law wherein the mark is registeredY'
The Madrid Agreement's vision of a globally comprehensive in-
ternational registration system for trademarks has never been realized,
due in large part to a lack of general acceptance in the international
community. For various reasons, the United States, the United King-
dom, Japan, and other major countries have refused to adhere to its
tenets4f In any event, the Madrid Agreement "does not deal with the
rules applicable to trademark protection that remain under the na-
tional law of each country of protection; the principle of territorial-
ity"" and the principle of Independence of Rights are still firmly en-
trenched and govern the bulk of substantive trademark law for
member states.4 ' The Madrid Agreement, then, does not by itself con-
fer any substantive rights; the "substantive rights flow from the exten-
sions of protection emanating from the international registration,"
and are therefore fully national or territorial in nature.3
See Ian Jay Kaufman, Madrid Agreement: Will Reform Proposals Attract More Mem-
bers., 12 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 407, 408 (1990) (stating that from the date of inter-
national registration marks "are subject to the same rules... as marks filed at the na-
tional level").
+, See Leaffer, supra note 6, at 13 (discussing the reasons for a lack of international
acceptance of the Madrid Agreement). For the United States, and several other na-
tions, adherence to the Madrid Agreement was unattractive for several reasons, includ-
ing provisions that favored mark holders from countries with quick examination and
registration systems (such as Spain), and the administratively taxing requirement that
all documents submitted under the Madrid Agreement be translated into French. See
id. at 14. In addition, the Madrid Agreement contained a "Central Attack" provision,
which provides that if the home country registration is attacked successfully during the
first five years of the term of international registration, then "all extensions of protec-
tion in the designated countries also fail." Id. This puts countries like the United
States that have many possible grounds for attacking their respective national registra-
tions at a comparative disadvantage. Registration in such states would be more likely
to be successfully invalidated, resulting in revocation of all rights via the central attack
provision. See Samuels & Samuels, supra note 38, at 443-44. Further, the twelve-month
time guideline governing the default registration of a mark is considered too short for
countries with lengthy examination procedures. See id. at 443. Another obstacle is,
ironically, the relatively inexpensive fee schedule. Due to the Madrid system's low ap-
plication fee, applicants in countries like the United States that use registration and
user fees to finance their national registration system would effectively be forced to
"subsidize the examination of applications filed by foreigners under the Agreement"
Id. at 444.
41 Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 19, at 203.
42 The Madrid Agreement, in effect, extended the Paris Convention's Principle of
Inde pendence of Rights by adherence to the principle of territoriality.
Samuels & Samuels, supra note 38, at 442.
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C. The Trademark Registration Treaty
In the mid-1960s, attempts to further harmonize international
trademark practice were initiated. The culmination of these attempts
was the Trademark Registration Treaty ("TRT"), which was adopted
in Vienna in 1973 and became effective in 1980. 4' The goals of the
TRT were to "offer solutions to commonly cited concerns with the
Madrid Agreement" and to "gain approval of those states that had re-
fused to sign the Madrid Agreement, including the United States." 6
The TRT was never widely adopted, however, and in essence was little
more than a filing treaty like the Madrid Agreement 47 The TRT pro-
vided that a formally correct filing would result in recordation of the
mark on an international register, after which the different national
laws would be used to evaluate the use of the marks, again leaving in-
tact the principles of territoriality and Independence of Rights.
48
However, as the TRT offered little advantage over the Madrid Agree-
ment, and as its provisions did not "fit" the existing trademark laws of
many nations, it was never well subscribed, and the international
trademark community was forced to look in another direction to de-
velop an international system of trademark registration and protec-
tion.
D. The Madrid Protocol
Despite the apparent failure of the TRT to harmonize interna-
tional trademark practice and gain worldwide acceptance, there re-
mained a perceived need for a new trademark treaty that would avoid
the glaring shortfalls of, and achieve more widespread adherence
than, the Madrid Agreement. In the early 1980s, the Madrid Union
Assembly (the governing body of the Madrid Agreement) requested
that the WIPO investigate potential changes to the Madrid Agreement
to ensure that other countries (especially the four non-Madrid
Agreement European Community members, Ireland, Great Britain,
4Trademark Registration Treaty, supra note 26.
45 See Leaffer, supra note 6, at 14 (describing the history of the TRT).
46 Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 19, at 203.
47 In fact, at its inception, only five nations had agreed to it: Burkina Faso, Congo,
the Gabon, the Soviet Union, and Togo. See Leaffer, supra note 6, at 14. A main short-
coming of the TRT in the eyes of the United States and other nations was that it did
not require use as the basis of trademark rights, but only intent to use. See id. at 15. In
1989, United States trademark law adopted the intent-to-use formulation. See id.
48 See id. at 14-15 (describing provisions of the TRT).
TRANSNATIONAL TRADEMARK PROTECTION
Denmark, and Greece) would become part of the Madrid Union.49
The result of their efforts was the Protocol Relating to the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks '
("Madrid Protocol"), which was signed on June 27, 1989, and entered
into force on April 1, 1996."'
The Madrid Protocol attempted to overcome the shortcomings of
the Madrid Agreement by adopting provisions that addressed the
concerns voiced against the Madrid Agreement.52 First, unlike the
Madrid Agreement, the Madrid Protocol permits international regis-
tration to be based on a national application rather than a national
registration.5' Second, the Madrid Protocol provides that if the na-
tional registration or application upon which the international appli-
cation was based is cancelled, the owner of the international registra-
tion may convert the international registration into distinct national
applications, while retaining the effective filing date of the original in-
ternational registration.54 Third, the Madrid Protocol allows filings in
4' See Samuels & Samuels, supra note 38, at 444 (tracing the historical impetus for
adoption of the Madrid Protocol). It is also interesting to note that the Madrid Union
Assembly sought a way that the Madrid Agreement could be "linked" to the proposed
CTM-thus the importance of making it possible for the four non-Madrid Agreement
European Community members to join the Madrid Agreement. See id.
' Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Regis-
tration of Marks, supra note 27.
% See Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 19, at 203 (describing the ratification process
of the Madrid Protocol and the substantive divergences it made from the Madrid
Agreement). For a detailed discussion of the relation between the Madrid Agreement
and the Madrid Protocol and how they affect current European Community trademark
law, see Gerd F. Kunze, The Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks as Ap-
plied Under the Protocol, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 223 (1994).
% Some of these concerns were outlined at supra note 40. For a discussion of how
the concerns of countries that did not join the Madrid Agreement affected the
changes initiated by the Madrid Protocol, including a discussion on how the impend-
ing CTM influenced the drafters, see Kaufman, supra note 39, at 410.
See Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 19, at 204 (describing changes affected by the
Madrid Protocol). This provision was designed to assuage the fears of countries which,
because acquiring their national registrations is a comparatively long process, were at a
competitive disadvantage. See supra note 40 (outlining reasons why countries declined
to enter the Madrid Agreement). The inclusion of this provision in the Madrid Proto-
col has been referred to as "going Dutch" because the delegation from the Nether-
lands proposed this change to the Madrid Agreement. See Kaufman, supra note 39, at
410.
, 4 See Leaffer, supra note 6, at 16 (describing the "comprehensive and one stop reg-
istration system" set forth in the Madrid Protocol). This provision was intended to
mitigate the consequences of the "central attack" provision of the Madrid Agreement.
See supra note 40 (stating countries' objections to entering the Madrid Agreement).
Essentially, this provision allows an owner of an international registration to convert
that registration into national applications, while preserving the original filing date, if
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English as well as in French, whereas the Madrid Agreement, by re-
quiring filings to be in French, presents greater procedural hurdles
for non-francophone countries. 5  Fourth, the Madrid Protocol en-
ables countries to charge fees that cover filing costs under the interna-
tional application procedures. 56 Finally, the Madrid Protocol extends
the deadlines for countries to notify applicants of denial of their na-
tional applications. Of these innovations, the most important is that
the Madrid Protocol was the first system that provided for interna-
tional application rather than international registration.rs
Despite all of the advances incorporated by the Madrid Protocol
when compared to the Madrid Agreement or to the TRT, its basic
function was the same-to harmonize the procedural aspects of inter-
national trademark registration. The larger and more difficult issue
of substantive harmonization is left mostly untouched by the Madrid
Protocol, and the principles of territoriality and Independence of
Rights underlie the tenets of the Protocol.5 9
E. The Trademark Law Treaty
In 1987 the WIPO began discussions concerning the issue of sub-
stantive harmonization with the goal of creating a new international
trademark treaty. A committee of trademark experts was commis-
sioned, and meetings on the subject were held between 1989 and
1993. The initial ambitious goal of the meetings was to produce an
the basic registration is canceled. SeeLeaffer, supra note 6, at 16.
55 See id. (detailing improvements made by the Madrid Protocol). incidentally, for
the notoriously monolingual American trademark holders, the symbolic appeal of this
provision is readily apparent.
56 See id. (noting that this provision offsets the low-fee arrangement of the Madrid
Agreement, which disadvantaged systems where registration is financed by user fees).
5, See Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 19, at 204 (comparing the time period for de-
nial under the Madrid Protocol and the Madrid Agreement). This provision limits the
disadvantage to countries with relatively long examination and opposition timetables.
Under the Madrid Agreement, such countries were hurried in their examinations in
order to comply with the Madrid Agreement's shorter time frame. See id.
5s See Kaufman, supra note 39, at 410 (noting that the Madrid Protocol would "re-
sult in a treaty for international application, not registration"). A system of registration
provides for the registration of a trademark that is then converted into national appli-
cations that grant actual trademark rights. A system of international application would
eliminate the need for the separate national applications for trademark rights and
would provide rights on the basis of that international application.
59 See Kunze, supra note 51, at 223, 225 (1994) (noting that under the Madrid Pro-
tocol, the scope of protection afforded to the trademark is defined by the substantive
law of the country wherein it is registered).
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agreement that would "span all aspects of trademark protection."6
After two initial meetings that focused on substantive trademark lawr'
it became quite clear to the WIPO and to the participating countries
that there was "little hope of reconciling the substantial differences
existing in trademark law and practice around the world."62 "Conse-
quently, the substantive aspects of the [talks] were omitted, and the
committee devoted its time to the harmonization of trademark proce-
dures.""A As reoriented, the talks proved successful and a "Diplomatic
Conference" was convened in October of 1994 in Geneva. On Octo-
ber 27, the Conference adopted the Trademark Law Treaty4 ("TLT")
and, the following day, the TLT opened for signature.' The treaty
did not become effective, however, until August 1, 1996.66
The TLT accomplishes greater procedural harmonization of
trademark law by "setting forth a list of maximum requirements that
members may impose for various actions." 7 As such, it is not merely
an agreement providing for international registration of, or applica-
tion for, trademark rights. Instead, it is an agreement that seeks true
harmonization of the procedural guidelines for trademark protection.
,o Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 19, at 205.
61 See Samuels & Samuels, supra note 38, at 437-38 (noting that the early meetings
focused on the definition of a mark, grounds for refusal and other substantive provi-
sions).
k'4 Id. at 438. The difficulties were really two-fold. First, the substantive differences
in trademark law between the different countries proved to be a severe obstacle. For
example, some countries examine new marks solely on the grounds of "likelihood of
confusion" with previously registered marks, other countries examine the mark only to
ensure that it is not immoral or merely descriptive, and still other countries conduct
no examinations whatsoever. See id. at 438 n.35 (describing varying examination crite-
ria). Secondly, political conflicts arose, principally between the European Union and
the United States, relating to the nature of representation. "The EU demanded a
separate vote in the Trademark Law Treaty Assembly, in addition to the individual
votes of its member states; the non-Europeans [led by the United States] refused to
agree." Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 19, at 205 n.151.
,3 Leaffer, supra note 6, at 20 (citation omitted).
64 See id. (outlining the progression of the TLT into its final form); Samuels & Sa-
muels, supra note 38, at 437 (describing the WIPO's commitment to trademark har-
monization); Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 19, at 205 (noting that the treaty was
adopted in Geneva as a result of initiatives undertaken by the WIPO for the prepara-
tion of a new international trademark agreement).
65 On the first day the TLT was opened for signature (October 28, 1994), thirty-five
countries immediately signed it. See Leaffer, supra note 6, at 20 (tracing implementa-
tion of the TLT and noting that the United States was among the first group of signa-
tories).
See Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 19, at 205 (discussing the adoption of the
TLT).
67 Leaffer, supra note 6, at 20.
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For example, the TLT prevents member states from requiring "at-
testation, notarization, authentication, legalization, or certification of
any signature, except in the case of a surrender of a registration."6s
Such administrative requirements simply proved to be hindrances to
the efficient registration of international trademarks, and the TLT
seeks to streamline the registration process.69 The TLT also simplifies
post-registration requirements concerning changes in names, ad-
dresses and ownership of the registration. ° In addition, the TLT
standardizes the renewal stage of trademark rights by "setting forth
provisions for the duration of both the initial period of the registra-
tion and the renewal period to ten years each."7' A further provision
of the TLT requires member states to recognize and protect service
marks as well as trademarks and "to apply the provisions of the Paris
Convention to service marks."72
Despite its initial goals of providing for comprehensive and sub-
stantive harmonization of all aspects of international trademark law,
in the end, the TLT has provided little more than a greater system of
procedural harmonization for the registration and maintenance of
trademark rights. There have been, however, some successful-if
more regional-efforts at achieving procedural as well as substantive
transnational harmonization of trademark law.73 The prime example
6 Id. at 20-21.
69 See Samuels & Samuels, supra note 38, at 437 (noting that the TLT "contains a
number of simplifications that may ease many of the burdens currently faced by
trademark owners and practitioners").
70 See Leaffer, supra note 6, at 20-21 (describing regulatory provisions of the TLT).
71 Id. at 21.
72 Id.
73 Some lesser substantive regional trademark treaties include: Protocol of Har-
monization Approved by Decision No. 8/95 of the Council of the MERCOSUR Com-
mon Market (which is comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), see
Santiago R. O'Connor, Update: Protocol of Harmonisation in Mercosur, 118 TRADEMARK
WORLD 23 (1999) (discussing aspects of the Protocol among the MERCOSUR coun-
tries), Agreement on Intellectual Property Co-operation in the Association of South-
East Asian Nations (ASEAN is comprised of Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myan-
mar, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam), see Assafa Endeshaw, Har-
monization of Intellectual Property Laws in ASEAN Issues and Prospects, 2J. WORLD INTELL.
PRoP. 3, 3-4 (1999) (discussing terms of agreement, especially the formation of a re-
gional patent and trademark office), Decision 344 Concerning Trademark and Patent
Law by the Andean Community (consisting of Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Equador, and
Peru), see Andean Community Delegates Work on Revision of Decision 344, 13 WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REP. 277 (1999) (describing the revision of trademark policy in the An-
dean Community); James M. Cooper, Spirits in the Material World: A Post-Modern Ap-
proach to United States Trade Policy, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 957, 990 n.142 (1999) (listing
member states of Andean Community). This Comment does not deal with these re-
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of this is the development of the GTM 74 in the European Community.
III. COMPREHENSIVE HARMONIZATION: THE TRADE MARK
DIRECTIVE AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OFJUSTICE
On March 25, 1957, the Treaty of Rome7' was signed, creating the
European Economic Community.76 In the recitals of the treaty, the
purpose is announced as being "to ensure the economic and social
progress of... countries by common action to eliminate the barriers
which divide Europe."77 As an "essential objective" toward that goal,
the treaty calls for "concerted action" to remove the existing obstacles
to trade in order to "guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and
fair competition."7 Soon after the creation of the treaty, it was recog-
nized that in order to create a common market in Europe it would be
necessary to harmonize trademark law throughout the continent.
This harmonization would necessarily be substantive in nature, as the
ultimate goal was the creation of a unitary trademark system to govern
the entire European Community.7  Without the harmonization of ex-
isting national laws, any system governing Community-wide trademark
rights would face steep obstacles in the courts and legislatures of
gional agreements because they are quite limited in scope, especially in their enforce-
ment and remedy provisions. More comprehensive regional trademark protection has
been provided since 1971 in the BENELUX countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands), which will be discussed more thoroughly in the context of discussing the
CTM. See discussion infra notes 85, 96, 108, 113, 119 and accompanying text.
74 Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade
Mark, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1.
75 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Nov. 10, 1997, OJ. (C 340) 173
(1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF ROME].
"See Luis-Alfonso Durn, The New European Union Trademark Law, 23 DENV.J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 489, 489 n.1 (1995) (describing the background of the CTM).
TREATY OF ROME, supra note 75, recitals. Others have stated the purpose of the
Union even more broadly. Professor Larry Cata Backer wrote that "the fundamental
purpose of the European Union is harmonization at a level above that of the tradi-
tional national state. Indeed one can think of the sole overriding purpose of the
European Union as harmonization within its areas of competence. It is meant to inte-
grate, to consolidate ... epluribus unum." Backer, supra note 12, at 189.
7 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 75, recitals.
7c It may be helpful to think of the benefit and necessity of a unitary trademark
system in economic terms. Natural, as opposed to unitary, trademark law presents at
least two barriers to a common market: (1) it increases transaction costs by forcing the
mastery of a number of distinct legal regimes, and (2) even goods that have been in-
troduced to an industrial market, despite the increased transaction costs, could suffer
from the application of natural trademark law to stop the free flow of goods within the
market.
20001
324 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:309
member states. The first step in creating a unitary system was then the
creation of a directive requiring member states to harmonize their na-
tional trademark laws.
A. The Harmonization Directive
A working group was convened in 1964 to draft an agreement that
would provide for a European trademark. Discussions on the draft
began in 1973, and the Memorandum on the creation of an EEC
mark ° was published in 1976.8' This memorandum emphasized the
importance of trademark unification in Europe, and noted that "[t] he
protection accorded by an EEC trademark" would be "a substantial
contribution to the establishment of a system of undistorted competi-
tion within the common market, as required by the [Treaty of
Rome] 82
The first draft of a directive from the European Council calling
for the harmonization of European trademark law was published in
1980.13 The European Parliament and certain European Union com-
mittees (specifically, the Economic and Social Committees) scruti-
nized this draft, 4 and after several member states submitted remarks
on the proposal, a new draft was produced at the end of 1985. This
draft was then negotiated in a working group, where more changes
were added after heated debate,"' and the First Council Directive to
80 Memorandum on the Creation of an EEC Trade Mark, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES,
supplement 8/76,July 6, 1976, at 9.
See Charles Gielen, Harmonisation of Trade Mark Law in Europe: The First Trade
Mark Harmonisation Directive of the European Counci4 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 262,
262 (1992) (providing the background to the Harmonization Directive).
82 Id.
83 See id.
84 See id. (tracing the drafting history of the Harmonization Directive).
The biggest bone of contention was the insistence by the Dutch that the new
trademark not abandon the infringement criteria of the Benelux Trade Mark Act as
developed by the Benelux courts. See id. (discussing the history of the drafting of the
Harmonization Directive). The main development in Benelux law was the addition of
"likelihood of association" that came to augment "risk of confusion" in evaluating
whether a challenged mark infringed a previous one. See, e.g., Anna Carboni, Com-
ment, Confusion Clarified: Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 20 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 107, 108
(1998) (describing how "likelihood of association" was interpreted by the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ")). This Benelux innovation expands greatly the scope of
trademark protection. For example, if a company started to market cola under the
mark "Popsi-Cola," there might be no protection in a trademark regime that requires
risk of confusion, as consumers are unlikely to believe that Pepsi-Co is marketing
Popsi. Protection might attach, however, in a "likelihood of association" regime where
consumers might associate Popsi with Pepsi, thereby diluting the value of the Pepsi
TRANSNATIONAL TRADEMARK PROTECTION
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks8°
was approved on December 21, 1988.8'
The Trade Mark Directive was not intended to be a "full scale ap-
proximation of trade mark law,"' but was instead confined to the
harmonization of "those national provisions which most directly af-
fect[ed] the functioning of the internal market."89 It was intended not
as a final product, but as a necessary step in the process of promulgat-
ing a unitary trademark system to govern the whole of the European
Union.
As a harmonizing measure, the Trade Mark Directive did not es-
tablish a particular law to govern trademark issues in the European
Union. Rather, it set forth standards under which the member states
were to revise their national trademark laws.90 The only trademark
laws that were enforceable in the European Union were the national
trademark laws of member states. The Trade Mark Directive charged
each member state to "bring into force the laws, regulations and ad-
ministrative provisions necessary to comply with th[e] Directive not
later than 28 December 1991.""l The Trade Mark Directive contains
mark.
"e' First Council Directive 89/104 of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of
the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 OJ. (L 40) 1 [hereinafter Trade
Mark Directive].
K7 See Durdn, supra note 76, at 490 (discussing the adoption of the Trade Mark Di-
rective); Gielen, supra note 81, at 262 (tracing the development of the Trade Mark Di-
rective).
- Gielen, supra note 81, at 262.
hi Id. at 262-63. Recital 3 of the Trade Mark Directive reads as follows: "Whereas it
does not appear to be necessary at present to undertake full scale approximation of
the trade mark laws of the Member States and it will be sufficient if approximation is
limited to those national provisions of law which most directly affect the functioning of
the internal market." Trade Mark Directive, supra note 86, at 1.
The Trade Mark Directive essentially dictated that the laws of the member states
would "look alike" and illustrated the European Union's power and will to, in effect,
impose law directly on its member states. See Backer, supra note 12, at 186 (noting that
harmonization necessitates the power and the will to compel laws to look alike).
9, Trade Mark Directive, supra note 86, art. 16(1), at 7. The time for compliance
was extended to the end of December, 1992, pursuant to Article 16(2) when it became
clear that the member states were not going to have their laws "harmonized" by the
first deadline. See Gielen, supra note 81, at 263 (noting that the reason for the exten-
sion was "that only a few Member States had fulfilled their obligation to adapt their
trade mark law"). Several countries missed the extended deadline as well. For exam-
ple, the United Kingdom's new trademark law did not come into force until October
31, 1994, and the German trademark law was not enacted until January 1, 1995. See
Durin, supra note 76, at 490 (noting that not all member states "adapted their national
trademark laws to [the] harmonized criteria... within the time limit proscribed").
For additional discussion about how the United Kingdom's trademark law was changed
to adhere to the Trade Mark Directive, see Julian Gyngell, Trade Marks-Good News for
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both provisions that are exhaustive-those to which "Member States
have no power to add other" terms-and provisions that give signifi-
cant leeway to member states (especially in the realm of procedure) .92
Of the exhaustive provisions, some are "mandatory (the Member
States shall) and others are optional (the Member States may).""
The provisions of the Trade Mark Directive are generally neither
complex nor lengthy. A brief exploration of these provisions is valu-
able, however, since the Trade Mark Directive is truly an interim pro-
vision in the development of the CTM.
Article 1 defines the scope of the Trade Mark Directive, and in-
structs that the Directive shall apply to "every trade mark" in each na-
tion of the European Union, including international marks "having
effect in a Member State" and marks registered in the "Benelux Trade
Mark Office."94 Article 2 goes on to define a trademark as:
any sign capable of being represented graphically, particularly words, in-
cluding personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods
or of their packaging, provided that such signs are capable of distin-
gnishing the oods or services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings.
This broad definition is not exhaustive; a trademark can be virtu-
ally anything (including sounds and smells) as long as it is "capable of
"96distinguishing the goods or services.
Articles 3 and 4 dictate the terms governing the grounds for de-
nial or invalidation of a trademark registration. Article 3 sets forth the
absolute grounds for refusal or invalidity, while Article 4 governs the
relative grounds.97 Trademarks will be denied on absolute grounds if
Business, 144 NEwL.J. 1590 (1994).
92 See Gielen, supra note 81, at 264.
93 Id.
94 Trade Mark Directive, supra note 86, art. 1, at 2.
95 Id. art 2, at 2.
96 Gielen, supra note 81, at 265. Professor Gielen cites the Commission in the
European Parliament as suggesting that the definition of trademarks in the Trade
Mark Directive also covers sounds. See id. This wide interpretation of what can be a
trademark adopts the liberal view of the Benelux countries with regards to the purpose
of trademarks. Although traditionally the primary function of a trademark was as-
sumed to be to serve as an identifier of the origin of products or services, the Benelux
Trademark Act ("BTA") adopted a more encompassing view of the function of a
trademark. Article 1 of the BTA provides that a trademark "is a sign which serves to
distinguish goods and services (not the origin thereof)." Id. at 264.
97 Absolute grounds for refusal refers to situations in which the mark chosen is not
capable of being registered under any circumstances. On the other hand, relative
grounds for refusal refers to cases in which the mark would be qualified to be regis-
tered, save for some prior existing right or a risk of confusion. See Trade Mark Direc-
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they: (1) "are devoid of any distinctive character;"" (2) "consist exclu-
sively of signs or indications which have become customary;"9 (3) are
shapes that give "substantial value to the goods;"'" (4) "are contrary to
public policy or to accepted principles of morality;"'0' (5) are mislead-
ing as to the "nature, quality or geographical origin of the goods or
service; """ or (6) are in violation of Article 6 ter of the Paris Conven-
tion. 'l In addition, member states have the option of denying trade-
mark registrations on absolute grounds if. (1) the use of the mark
would violate some other national or Community "laws (for example
the Food and Drugs Act);"'04 (2) "the trade mark covers a sign of high
symbolic value, in particular a religious symbol;"" °  or (3) "the applica-
tion for registration of the trade mark was made in bad faith by the
applicant."" 6
The Trade Mark Directive calls for a registration to be refused (or
if already registered, invalidated) on relative grounds if the mark is
"identical with an earlier trade mark" and the registration is sought
for similar goods or services,'O' or if the mark is similar to an earlier
mark in such a way that "there exists a likelihood of confusion on the
part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with
the earlier trade mark."'0 8 It also provides that a member state may re-
tive, supra note 86, arts. 3-4, at 3-4 (defining terms governing absolute and relative
grounds for refusal).
Id. art. 3(l) (b), at 2.
Id. art. 3(1)(d), at 3.
Id. art. 3(1) (e), at 3.
Id. art. 3(1) (f), at 3.
1 Id. art. 3(1) (g), at 3.
Id. art. 3(1) (h), at 3. Article 6 terof the Paris Convention holds that items such
as the flags of nations cannot be registered as trade marks. See Gielen, supra note 81, at
265 (describing Article 6 ter).
::a Gielen, supra note 81, at 265.
: 5 Trade Mark Directive, supra note 86, art. 3(2) (b), at 3. Professor Gielen in-
forms us that this provision was enacted "under Greek influence" and suggests that it
prevents a cross from being registered as a trademark. Gielen, supra note 81, at 265.
W, Trade Mark Directive, supra note 86, art. 3 (2) (d), at 3.
17 Id. art. 4(1) (a), at 3. Earlier trademarks are defined as those community, na-
tional, or international trademarks (including Benelux marks) that were applied for
before the date of application of the trademark. See id. art. 4(2), at 3 (defining what
qualifies as an earlier trademark).
1- Id. art. 4(1) (b), at 3. The "likelihood of association" language reflects the in-
fluence of the Benelux trademark system and seemingly went beyond the limits of
trademark protection in many member states. This clause became subject to a land-
mark decision by the ECJ in Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191,
[1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445 (1998). For a discussion of the concept of the "likelihood of
association" in the Benelux trademark system, see John A. Tessensohn, May You Live in
Interesting Times-European Trademark Law in the Wake of Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 6 J.
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fuse or invalidate a mark if the mark is identical to a previously regis-
tered one-even if the mark is sought for different goods or services-
if the previous mark "has a reputation in the Member State," and "use
of the later mark ... would take unfair advantage of... the distinctive
character ... of the earlier trade mark."' ° A member state may also
refuse or invalidate a mark if the mark conflicts with a prior "non-
registered trade mark or [with] another sign used in the course of
trade,""' or if the mark conflicts with name rights, rights of "personal
portrayal," copyrights, or an "industrial property right."'
Article 5 of the Trade Mark Directive is perhaps the most substan-
tively important article. It sets forth the substantive rights to be con-
ferred by a trademark in member states and introduces the criteria for
infringement. Article 5 clearly provides that the holder of a duly reg-
istered mark shall "be entitled to prevent all third parties not having
his consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is identi-
cal with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are iden-
tical with those for which the trade mark is registered."
2
It also provides that the holder of a mark can prevent the use of a
sign in situations where,
because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and the iden-
tity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade mark and
the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public,
which includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the
trade mark."3
INTELL. PROP. L. 217, 229-31 (1999).
109 Trade Mark Directive, supra note 86, art. 4(4) (a), at 4.
110 Id. art. 4(4) (b), at 4.
I Id. art. 4(4) (c), at 4. Name rights might prohibit the use of the mark "Ma-
donna" for music cassettes, while industrial property rights might provide redress for a
proprietor who has "rights to the name of a plant variety" if that name comes up for
trademark registration. Gielen, supra note 81, at 265.
112 Trade Mark Directive, supra note 86, art. 5 (1) (a), at 4.
1 Id. art. 5(1) (b), at 4. This language differs greatly in scope and breadth from
the language of earlier drafts of the Trade Mark Directive. For example, the 1980
draft provided that the trademark would confer upon the holder "the exclusive right
to prevent the use of his mark or a similar sign for the same or similar goods if by such
use there is 'serious likelihood of confusion on the part of the public.'" Gielen, supra
note 81, at 266 (quoting Proposal for a First Council Directive to Approximate the
Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, art. 3(l), 1980 OJ. (C 351) 1, 3).
This early language seemingly would have limited the scope of trademark protection,
thereby rejecting the advances made in the protection of trademarks, especially in the
Benelux countries. See id. (noting that "[i]f adopted, [this language] would in fact
have weakened the protection of trade marks under national laws"). Therefore, the
early draft language was clearly unacceptable to the Benelux countries, and in 1985
the word "serious" was dropped. See id. Finally, the current language was adopted af-
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Article 5 also allows member states to entite the holder of a trade-
mark to prevent third parties from using identical or similar marks in
relation to goods dissimilar from those for which the trademark is reg-
istered. "1
The Trade Mark Directive also provides for limits on the effects of
a trademark"' and for exhaustion of rights conferred by use of a
trademark.11 Article 8 provides for the granting of "exclusive or non-
exclusive" licenses of trademarks,"7 and Article 9 provides that if the
proprietor of an earlier trademark has knowingly acquiesced in the
use of the later registered trademark for five consecutive years, then
the earlier proprietor loses her rights to apply for a declaration of in-
validity."" Article 10 is a key provision in that it requires "genuine use"
of the trade mark within five years of registration." 9
Once a trademark has been registered, it may be revoked if not
used, 2" if "in consequence of acts or inactivity of the proprietor, [the
mark] has become the common name in the trade for a product or
ter vigorous lobbying by the Dutch, and embraces "a clear recognition that in present
times a trade mark not only functions as an indication of origin but can constitute a
valuable asset in and of itself." Id.
114 Trade Mark Directive, supra note 86, art. 5(2), at 4. This optional provision was
also influenced by the delegations from the Benelux countries, who, over arguments
that such a broad protection of trademarks "would carry the risk of an extension of the
monopoly of the trade mark owner beyond the proper needs of trade mark protec-
tion," convinced the other delegations that member states should have the possibility
of providing for protection of trademarks with respect to dissimilar goods and services.
Gielen, supra note 81, at 267.
1" Trade Mark Directive, supra note 86, art. 6, at 5. Such limitations include the
right of a person to use, in the course of trade, his own name or address, id. art. 6(a),
at 5, to indicate the kind or quality of good, id. art. 6(b), at 5, or "to indicate the in-
tended purpose of a product or service, in particular as accessories or spare parts," id.
art. 6(c), at 5.
1,- Id. art. 7, at 5. The provision for the exhaustion of rights conferred by a trade-
mark "can be seen as protectionist for trade in the European communities." Gielen,
supra note 81, at 268. It deprives the proprietor of a trademark of the right to prohibit
the use of the trademark "in relation to goods which have been put on the market in
the Communi under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent." Trade
Mark Directive, supra note 86, art. 7(1), at 5 (emphasis added).
117 Trade Mark Directive, supra note 86, art. 8(1), at 5.
SX Id. art. 9, at 5.
119 Id. art. 10, at 5. This rule also closely follows the developed Benelux trademark
law. See Gielen, supra note 81, at 268 (discussing the leading case from the Benelux
courts requiring the use of a trademark). Nevertheless, the failure to put a trademark
to use can be overlooked if there are "proper reasons for non-use." Trade Mark Direc-
tive, supra note 86, art. 10(1), at 5.
'1., See Trade Mark Directive, supra note 86, art. 12(1), at 6 (asserting that a mark
will lose its validity if it is not used for five years in the member state wherein the mark
is registered).
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service, ""' or if "the use made of [the mark] by the proprietor... is
liable to mislead the public, particularly as to the nature, quality or
geographical origin of those goods or services." 22  The procedure
governing the revocation of marks, like the procedure for the registra-
tion and opposition to marks, is largely left up to the national laws of
the member states.'25
The provisions of the Trade Mark Directive were quickly adopted
into national law by some European countries,2 although it took a
significant period of time for other countries to amend their national
laws to conform to the Directive's dictates. 25 The real test, however,
would come with the defining of the terms of the Trade Mark Direc-
tive-a task to be undertaken (ultimately) by the ECJ.
B. The Harmonization Directive Clarified: Sabel BV v. Puma AG
and the Definition of Terms
The Trade Mark Directive, a product of nearly a decade of intense
negotiations and numerous compromises, would prove to challenge
the existing trademark regimes of many European Union member
states. In particular, many of the Benelux trademark innovations that
found their way into the Trade Mark Directive were largely inconsis-
tent with the national trademark laws of member states, including the
United Kingdom and Germany. Even after these countries adapted
their laws to comply with the provisions of the Trade Mark Directive,
the national courts of the member states were left with the task of de-
fining the Trade Mark Directive's terms and applying them consis-
tently to trade mark disputes. The result was anything but a consistent
treatment of the harmonized laws in the national courts.
A picture of the discord can be seen by examining the interpreta-
tion of the infringement criteria ("likelihood of confusion" and "like-
lihood of association") contained in Articles 4 and 5 of the Trade
121 Id. art. 12(2) (a), at 6.
12 Id. art. 12(2)(b),at6.
123 See DurSn, supra note 76, at 490 (noting that the Trade Mark Directive gives "a
certain degree of freedom to the national countries to legislate in different ways some
aspects of their trademark laws, such as, the procedural system").
124 In fact, Spain (the first country to meet the demands of harmonization) actually
harmonized its trademark law to conform to the Trade Mark Directive a month before
the final text of the Trade Mark Directive was adopted. See id. (tracing the history of
the member states' revision of national trademark laws).
12 See id. (noting that both Germany and the United Kingdom missed the ex-
tended deadline for conforming their national laws).
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Mark Directive." 6 The language that the different European Union
states adopted in their "harmonized" national trademark laws closely
mapped the language in Articles 4 and 5. As a result, the letter of the
law was quite similar throughout the European Union.'2 Because the
enforcement of these provisions was left to the respective national
courts, however, it soon became apparent that the "likelihood of con-
fusion" and "likelihood of association" language was not being inter-
preted consistently. Some national courts held that finding a likeli-
hood of confusion by the public was a precondition to finding
U6 See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text (discussing the content of Articles
4 and 5).
17 For example, compare the language contained in the trademark laws of the fol-
lowing countries with the language in Articles 4 and 5 of the Trade Mark Directive.
England
A person infringes a registered trademark if he uses in the course of trade a
sign where because (a) the sign is identical with the trademark and is used in
relation to goods or services similar to those for which the trademark is regis-
tered, or (b) the sign is similar to the trademark and is used in relation to
goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the trademark is
registered, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which
includes the likelihood of association with the trademark.
Tessensohn, supra note 108, at 234 n.79 (1999) (quoting UK Trade Marks Act, 1994, c.
26, § 10(2) (Eng.)) (emphasis added).
Italy
[T]he owner of a registered trademark has the right to prevent third parties
from unauthorized use of 'a sign identical with or similar to the registered
mark, for identical or similar goods or services, if, on account of the identity
or similarity between the two signs and of the identity or similarity among the
products or services, a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public may arise,
which may also consist in a risk of association between the two signs.'
Id. at 237 n.96 (quoting FAMOUS AND WELL-KNowN MARYS, AN INTERNATIONAL
ANALYSIS 637 (Frederick Mostert et al. eds., 1997) (emphasis added).
Germany
Third parties shall not be permitted to make the following use in commerce
without consent of the trademark owner: to use a mark if the 'identical or
similar nature of such mark to the registered trademark and the identical or
similar nature of goods or services covered by the mark or registered trade-
mark creates a likelihood of confusion among the public, including the likelihood
of association between the mark and the registered trademark.'
Id. at 243 n.124 (quoting FAMOUS AND WELL-KN wN MARKS, AN INTERNATIONAL
ANALYSIS, supra, at 629-30) (emphasis added); see also Marta Perteg s Sender, Case Law:
Sabel v. Puma, 5 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 135, 136 (1999) (noting that the German court also
cited the language in paragraph 9(1) (2) of the German Trademark Law). Similar lan-
guage can be found in the amended trademark law of Denmark, see Tessensohn, supra
note 108, at 241 n.1 14 (noting the addition of "likelihood of association"), and in the
trademark law of the BTA, see id. at 233 n.76 (noting that § 13(A) (2) has been
amended to add the "likelihood of association" language that had been developed in
the Benelux courts).
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trademark infringement;"" others held that likelihood of association
between a product and another registered mark by the public estab-
lished infringement. 29 This conflict in interpretation highlighted the
primary difficulty with having disparate national courts interpret
"harmonized" law; each court made such interpretations based on the
history and ideology of trademark rights in its jurisdiction.
It became clear that the confusion about the meaning and scope
of the infringement language needed to be reconciled by the ECJ.
The European Union's highest court spoke for the first time on the
matter in the case of Sabel BVv. Puma AG.'o The case involved a clas-
sic trademark dispute that illustrates nicely the confusion surrounding
the application of Europe's new "harmonized" trademark law.
Sabel BV ("Sabel"), a Dutch company, applied to register its
trademark, a depiction of a running cheetah with the name "sabMl"
underneath, in Germany. 131 The German company Puma AG
("Puma") "lodged opposition on the basis of its earlier registered
mark[s]" which depicted a bounding feline form (a puma) in silhou-
ette and a leaping feline form, also in silhouette.132 The basis of the
opposition was that the Sabel mark (which was to be registered in one
of the same classes as the Puma mark) was too similar to the marks
1 England is the prime example of a country requiring an actual likelihood of
confusion on behalf of the public as to the source of the product as a precondition to
finding infringement. This comports closely with the traditional common law idea
that a trademark functions solely to identify the origin of a good. The key English case
interpreting the new provision is Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants PLC 22 Fleet
Sheet Rep. 713 (Ch. 1995). Denmark apparently adopted an even higher standard,
requiring "actual or real confusion" to find liability and holding that likelihood of as-
sociation added little or nothing to the analysis. Tessensohn, supra note 108, at 242.
Germany also interpreted the language of the Trade Mark Directive as requiring con-
fusion rather than mere association to find liability. See id. at 243-245 (describing
German court decisions relating to the new trademark law).
1 Of course, the Benelux countries are the greatest proponents of finding liability
if there is a likelihood of association. See Tessensohn, supra note 108, at 231-33 (dis-
cussing trademark case law in Benelux courts). Italy also seemed to give some weight
to the association language by finding liability if the public would make an "economic"
association because of the similarity of the marks. Id. at 237.
ISO Case C-251/95, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R- 445 (1998). Additionally,
the case contains pictorial depictions of the marks, allowing at least some insight into
why one figure is considered to be leaping, and the other bounding. See id. For an
exhaustive study of the procedural posture and substantive content of the case, see
Tessensohn, supra note 108.
131 See Sender, supra note 127, at 135 (tracing the history of the dispute between
Sabel and Puma).
132 Id.; see also Carboni, supra note 85, at 107 (describing and illustrating Puma's
marks).
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that were registered by Puma. 3 Puma's "argument was essentially
that the public would associate the two marks, since both meant the
same thing (i.e., bounding felines) and both covered similar or iden-
tical goods."1' Puma's argument depended on a liberal interpretation
of the "likelihood of confusion" language introduced into German
trademark law by force of the Trade Mark Directive.
The German Patent Office ruled against Puma and in favor of reg-
istering Sabel's mark, deciding that "there was no similarity for trade-
mark law purposes between the two marks.""5 Puma appealed the rul-
ing to the Federal Patent Court which reversed the Patent Office and
"refuse[d] [Sabel's] trade mark application.""36 Sabel then exercised
its right to appeal to the Federal Supreme Court of Germany. 37
The Federal Supreme Court made a provisional ruling, based on
the tests used under the old law for determining "whether there [was]
a likelihood of confusion," that there "was no such likelihood, "'s and
that Sabel's "sign could be protected in Germany."" 9 The German
Court, however, referred the case to the ECJ and certified a question
under Article 234 of the Treaty of Rome' ° for a preliminary ruling on
11ki The Puma mark was registered "in respect of, inter alia, jewellery [sic], leather
goods, clothing and other fashion accessories," and Sabel sought to register their mark
"in respect of, inter aliajewellery [sic] and ornaments." Carboni, supra note 85, at 107.
Tessensohn, supra note 108, at 246. For a list of what goods the trademarks in
question covered, see supra note 133.
'. Sender, supra note 127, at 136; see also Carboni, supra note 85, at 107 (noting
that Sabel prevailed in the opposition proceeding before the German Patent Office).
IM, Carboni, supra note 85, at 107; see also Sender, supra note 127, at 136 (noting
that the Federal Patent Court revoked the decision of the Patent Office).
17 See Sender, supra note 127, at 136 (tracing the procedural history of the case).
VN Id. The court clearly "endorsed the traditional origin/confusion approach and
eschewed the expansive Benelux approach." Tessensohn, supra note 108, at 245.
134 Sender, supra note 127, at 136.
W Article 234 of the Treaty of Rome provides that
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings con-
cerning:
a. the interpretation of this Treaty;
b. the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Com-
munity and of the ECB;
c. the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of
the Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that decision on the question
is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court ofJustice to give a
ruling thereon.
TREAT' OF ROME, supra note 75, art. 234. ECJ judgments on reference for preliminary
rulings are "binding on the court or tribunal that referred the question and on any
other court that rules on the same issue in the future. The ECJ's judgment also func-
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the meaning of Articles 4 and 5 of the Trade Mark Directive. The ECJ
summarized the issue as follows:
[Tihe [Federal Supreme Court] is essentially asking whether the crite-
rion of the "likelihood of confusion... which includes the likelihood of
association with the earlier trade mark" in Article 4(1) (b) of the Direc-
tive is to be interpreted as meaning that the mere association which the
public might make between two marks as a result of a resemblance in
their semantic content is a sufficient ground for concluding that there
exists a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of that provision
141
Although other European national courts interpreted the lan-
guage of Article 4(1) (b) without referring it to the EJ for clarifica-
tion, the Federal Supreme Court, keeping in mind the "main objec-
tive of the Directive: approximation of the laws of the Member States
'in view of the objectives of the internal market,"' stressed the impor-
tance of clarification to ensure "uniform interpretation of the confu-
sion concept."
4 1
The governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands
entered submissions to the ECJ arguing that the "likelihood of associa-
tion" language had been added to the Trade Mark Directive at their
request, and therefore, it should be interpreted in light of Benelux
case law.'44 In support of this argument, the Benelux countries
pointed to a statement entered into the minutes of the European
Council meeting at which the CIM regulation was adopted. 4' The
statement read: "The Council and the Commission note that 'likeli-
tions as precedent that the ECJ will abide by in future similar matters." Tessensohn,
supra note 108, at 245 n.133.
141 Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 1997 E.C.R 1-6191, 1-6221, [1998] 1
C.M.L.R. 445, 469 (1998).
1 This resulted in conflicting interpretations-especially between the United
Kingdom and the Benelux countries. See Gert-Jan Van De Kamp, Protection of Trade
Marks: The New Regime-Beyond Origin2 , 20 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 364 (1998) (not-
ing that post-Trade Mark Directive case law in the United Kingdom, especially the Wa-
gamama case, clearly adopted the classic confusion interpretation of the Directive,
while "[p] ost-Directive case law in the Benelux is unambiguous in its support for non-
origin association").
4 Id.
144 See Carboni, supra note 85, at 108 (describing the Benelux position).
145 The statement referred to is a statement given for entry in the minutes of the
council meeting at which the Regulation was adopted in 1993. The statement was
given to help explain Articles 8(1) (b) and 9(1) (b) of the Community Trade Mark
Regulation, which adopted the same likelihood of association language put forth by
the Trade Mark Directive. The entire text of Statements for Entry can be found in M.
A. BAz ET AL., EUROPEAN CoMMUNIY TRADE MARK& COMMENTARY TO THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNrUYREGULATIONS 155-59 (Mario Franzosi ed., 1997).
TRANSNATIONAL TRADEMARK PROTECTION
hood of association' is a concept which in particular has been devel-
oped by Benelux case-law.
" 
,1
4
This position was vigorously opposed by the Government of the
United Kingdom, which put in a submission contesting the Benelux
position, arguing that the wording of the Trade Mark Directive did
not intend for likelihood of association to be an alternative to the like-
lihood of confusion, but rather "served to define its scope."147 The
Advocate General, 8 supporting the United Kingdom's position,
opined that the language in the Trade Mark Directive referred to
"confusion as to the origin of the goods or services in question," and
that the purpose of the association language "clarif[ied] that 'confu-
sion' covered the mistaken assumption of an organizational or eco-
nomic link between the undertakings marketing the products or serv-
ices."1'4  The EGJ largely sided with the United Kingdom, by holding
that the grammar and context of Articles 4 and 5 dictated the conclu-
sion that the "the concept of likelihood of association was not an al-
ternative to that of likelihood of confusion, but served to define its
scope."5" The EGJ then looked to the Tenth Recital of the Trade
Mark Directive, T5 and its "material phrase was: 'the likelihood of con-fusion... constitutes the specific condition for such protection,'" thus
14 Id. at 155.
147 Carboni, supra note 85, at 108.
10 The Advocate General is a figure whose duty is to "present to the EGJ reasoned
submissions on cases to assist the ECJ in the performance" of its duties under the
Treaty of Rome. Tessensohn, supra note 108, at 248 n.137. The Advocate General
must "analyze the case in an impartial and independent manner and their submissions
,are objective and do not represent the views of either party.'" Id. (quoting PENELOPE
KENT, EUROPEAN COMfMUNrTy LAW 18 (1992)).
149 Tessensohn, supra note 108, at 248.
l, Sender, supra note 127, at 138.
151 The Tenth Recital reads as follows:
Whereas the protection afforded by the registered trade mark, the function of
which is in particular to guarantee the trade mark as an indicator of origin, is
absolute in the case of identity between the mark and the sign and goods or
services; whereas the protection applies also in case of similarity between the
mark and the sign and the goods or services; whereas it is indispensable to
give an interpretation of the concept of similarity in relation to the likelihood
of confusion; whereas the likelihood of confusion, the appreciation of which
depends on numerous elements and, in particular, on the recognition of the
trade mark on the market, of the association which can be made with the used
or registered sign, of the degree of similarity between the trade mark and the
sign and between the goods or services identified, constitutes the specific
condition for such protection; whereas the ways in which likelihood of confu-
sion may be established, and in particular the onus of proof, are a matter for
national procedural rules which are not prejudiced by the Directive.
Trade Mark Directive, supra note 86, recital 10, at 2.
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supporting the conclusion that "the 'likelihood of association' criteria
cannot apply unless there is confusion on part of the public." 52 This
interpretation of the Trade Mark Directive closely follows the tradi-
tional view of the function of trademarks-that they serve to identify
the origin or source of a product.
This decision by the ECJ, and the very fact that such a decision was
rendered at all, points to the great advantage that the Trade Mark Di-
rective has over previous attempts at international harmonization ef-
forts for trademark law: it provides for a conclusive and binding in-
terpretation of the terms of the harmonized measures so that the
invariably different national interpretations of the laws can be recon-
ciled, and true harmonization can be achieved.'" The presence of the
ECJ as a final arbiter and interpreter of the harmonized law provides
not only for successful and substantive harmonization, but also sets
the stage for the creation of a unitary system of trademark protection
that relies not on the national laws of the various member states for
enforcement, but rather on a new and unitary provision: the CTM.
152 Tessensohn, supra note 108, at 252-53. It has been suggested that this holding
would allow "direct confusion (i.e. the mistaken assumption that the goods in question
came from the same undertaking) but also indirect confusion (i.e. the mistaken as-
sumption that there is an organizational or economic link between the undertakings
marketing the goods) to fall within" trademark protection under the Trade Mark Di-
rective. Sender, supra note 127, at 138; see also Tessensohn, supra note 108, at 251-52
(making the same observation). The Trade Mark Directive, as interpreted, would not,
however, create infringement in the case where "the public considers the sign to be
similar to the mark and perception of the sign calls to mind the memory of the mark,
although the two are not confused." Tessensohn, supra note 108, at 252. Therefore,
the Trade Mark Directive is said to cover "direct" and "indirect" confusion as long as a
likelihood of association exists in relation to an earlier trademark.
1 Several commentators view the Sabel ruling as requiring a change in Benelux
trademark practice to conform with the interpreted language of the Trade Mark Direc-
tive. See Tessensohn, supra note 108, at 255 (remarking that the "whole corpus of
Benelux association case law" and certain Italian decisions "may now be seen as incon-
sistent with Article 4(1) (b) and are unlikely to be followed anywhere in Europe"); Van
De Kamp, supra note 142, at 366 (noting that as a consequence of the Sabel decision,
"the Benelux will have to review critically its former case law"). Other commentators
do not believe that the Sabel decision will have much effect on the trademark law prac-
tices of the member states of the European Union. See Charles Gielen, A Benelux Per-
sepective: Sabel v. Puma, 20 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 109, 111 (1998) ("Looking at the
outcome of the case, there is unlikely to be much change in the Benelux practice.");
Sender, supra note 127, at 141 (remarking that "the change imposed on [the Belenux]
approach is not that considerable"). Regardless of the effect of the Sabel decision, the
fact that under Community law, the ECJ can function as a final interpreter of the har-
monized law constitutes a huge improvement over other attempts at international
trademark harmonization.
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IV. BEYOND HARMONIZATION: THE CTM
The Trade Mark Directive was never intended to be an end in and
of itself. Rather, it was viewed as a necessary precursor to the ultimate
goal of divorcing trademark law from the inevitable factionalization
created by relying on national laws (even if harmonized) for trade-
mark protection. Creating a unitary trademark system that governs
the procedural and substantive provisions of trademark law through-
out the entire European Union would accomplish this goal. The
adoption of the European CTM largely achieved this objective.
A. The Procedural Background to the European CTM
From the earliest consideration of the harmonization of trade-
mark law throughout the European Union, the ideal had been to in-
troduce the Community Trade Mark Regulation at the same time as
the Trade Mark Directive.'- However, because of competing national
interests, political problems arose that made this goal impractical.
Therefore, in 1988, the European Council decided to adopt the Trade
Mark Directive first.'5 The main political hurdles related to the estab-
lishment of institutions and procedures that would govern the ad-
ministration of the new CTM.
First, it was imperative that a site be selected for the establishment
of a central office to facilitate the trademark system. The location of
the office became a heated issue, 56 and it was only after a considerable
lobbying effort on behalf of Spain, and a meeting of the Presidents
of the Member Countries in Brussels on October 29, 1993, that Ali-
cante was chosen as the site for the Office for Harmonization in the
Internal Market ("OHIM")lo
Second, the issue of language-a sensitive issue throughout all of
Europe, with cultural and historical implications-had to be resolved
before selecting an official operating language for OHIM. Early
speculation was that English would be chosen as the official lan-
i Gielen, supra note 81, at 262.
Id.
In fact, one scholar referred to the issue of the administrative office location as
an "all-but-insurmountable obstacle." Kaufinan, supra note 39, at 412.
17 See id. (noting that "virtually all Member States have proposed that their nation
be home to the office" and that "[l]ike the Armada, Spain has sent forth a very serious
bid for.., the site").
158 See Durdn, supra note 76, at 491 (reporting that it was decided at the October 29
meeting to award the office to Spain, and that in November of 1993, the "Spanish
Cabinet decided to locate the new office in the City of Alicante").
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guage, 9 but fervent opposition by France, Spain, Germany, and Por-
tugal' 6° led to a potentially unwieldy compromise: five official lan-
guages were chosen.' 61 The OHIM would operate officially in English,
French, German, Italian, or Spanish.
Another issue of concern was the staffing of the OHIM; it was im-
perative that no favoritism be exhibited to one country or another in
appointing the administrators of the new trade mark system. In the
end, a Frenchman was selected as the President of the OHIM, while
the Vice President for Legal Matters was German, the Vice President
for Administrative Matters was Spanish, and the President of the Ad-
ministrative Council of the OHIM was Portuguese."'
Having settled, at least provisionally, the political issues that im-
peded the implementation of the Community's system of trademark
protection, the Trade Mark Regulation 63 was approved on December
20, 1993, and it came into force on March 15, 1994.5 When OHIM
came into operation onJanuary 1, 1996, the CTM was launched.
B. Provisions of the Trade Mark Regulation: Procedures
Fit to Meet Substance
The substantive provisions of the Trade Mark Regulation were in-
tended to be the same as the provisions of the Trade Mark Directive.
These provisions, therefore, were to be but a small departure from the
national laws of the member states that had already harmonized their
laws to meet the substantive demands of the Trade Mark Directive.
The innovation of the Trade Mark Regulation, then, is not in its sub-
stantive provisions, but rather in its detailed procedural provisions
that set forth the administrative procedures that will govern the regis-
tration, opposition, publication, and (most importantly) enforcement
of the substantive rights conferred by the CTM.
Article 1 provides that trademarks issued in accordance with the
159 Kaufnan, supra note 39, at 412.
160 Id. (noting that "France ... does not recognise that French in this era has been
supplanted by English as the international language and Spain contends that there are
more Spanish-speaking people in the world than French or English .... Additionally,
German is a strong contender [and ejven Portugal has suggested that Portuguese be
accepted").
I Durdn, supra note 76, at 492; see also Council Regulation (EC) 40/94 of 20 De-
cember 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, art. 115, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1 [hereinafter
Trade Mark Regulation] (setting forth the official languages of the OHIM).
62 Duran, supra note 76, at 492.
163 Trade Mark Regulation, supra note 161.
164 Durin, supra note 76, at 491.
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Trade Mark Regulation will be called "Community trade marks," and
establishes that the CTM will have a "unitary character" with "equal
effect throughout the Community."' The CTM is unitary in the
sense that it can be registered, assigned, or licensed with a single filing
with the OHIM. 16 With that single filing, an applicant can obtain
rights throughout the European Union, rather than having to file
separately in each member state. The downside of the CTM's unitary
character, however, is that any assignment or license of a CTM must
be for the entire European Union. Similarly, if a CTM is declared in-
valid for any reason, it is invalidated in the entire European Union.
It is important to note that national trademark registrations and the
rights that they confer are not affected by the development of the
CTM; those rights will still be enforceable as they were before, and the
rights conferred by the (TM will exist concurrently with the national
rights.18
The OHIM is established by Article 2 of the Regulation." 9 Articles
4 through 15 closely map the provisions of the Trade Mark Directive
and set forth the substantive provisions that will govern the CTM.
These articles define what can be registered as a CTM, 7° the criteria
governing absolute and relative grounds for refusing to register a
CTM,' 7' the rights conferred by a CTM, 2 the limitations on the rights
of CTM holders,' 73 the exhaustion of rights conferred by a CTM,174 and
10 Trade Mark Regulation, supra note 161, art. 1 (1)-(2), at 3.
166 This is quite different from the provisions of the Paris Convention or the Ma-
drid Protocol, which treat each application, ultimately, as a national application, and
that might require separate renewal, opposition, licensing, or registration procedures
depending on how the application is processed on the national level.
See GRAEME DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
AND PoLIcv (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 1679, on file with author) (describing
unitary nature of system).
16A See Leaffer, supra note 6, at 25 (noting that the Trade Mark Regulation does
"not abolish national trademark protection, rather, it creates a (mark] that co-exists
with national trademarks").
10 Trade Mark Regulation, supra note 161, art. 2, at 3.
176 See id. art. 4, at 3 (repeating the content of Article 2 of the Trade Mark Direc-
tive).
171 See id. arts. 7-8, at 4 (providing the grounds for refusing to register a CTM).
These articles follow up on and clarify Articles 3 and 4 of the Trade Mark Directive.
For an explanation of "absolute" versus "relative" grounds, see supra note 97.
172 See Trade Mark Regulation, supra note 161, art. 9, at 5 (defining the rights con-
ferred by a CTM).
'7" See id. art. 12, at 6 (repeating the content of Article 6 of the Trade Mark Direc-
tive).
See id. art. 13, at 6 (repeating the content of Article 7 of the Trade Mark Direc-
tive).
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the requirement that the trade mark holder use the mark in com-
merce.' The vast majority of the remainder of the 143 articles set
forth the procedural provisions that govern the granting and en-
forcement of CTMs.
There are several distinct steps in the process of obtaining a CTM.
The first step is the application process. An application must: (1)
identify and graphically represent the subject mark; (2) identify the
goods or services in respect of which the registration is requested; (3)
identify the applicant; (4) be accompanied by the proper payment
fee; (5) declare any priority claimed due to the existence of a previous
application for a national or international trademark; and (6) declare
any seniority claimed based on the existence of a valid registered na-
tional or international mark.176 The application may be filed in any of
the official languages of the European Community,177 but must desig-
nate a second language, which is required to be one of the official
languages of the OHIM 7 It may also be filed in Alicante with the
OHIM, or in any of the national trademark offices, including the
Benelux office.'7 9 Although the CTM is an "open" system, meaning
even non-European Union citizens can apply for CTM registration,
the Trade Mark Regulation provides that any non-European Union
domiciled applicant must appoint a "professional representative[]" to
represent the applicant in any proceedings before the OHIM other
than the mere filing of an application. 80
Once OHIM has received the application, it scrutinizes the appli-
175 See id. art. 15, at 6 (requiring "genuine use" of the CTM within five years of reg-
istration). This is the same use requirement contained in Article 10 of the Trade Mark
Directive.
176 See id. art. 26, at 9 (defining the "conditions with which applications must com-
ply"). The conditions are further defined, pursuant to the implementing authority
granted in Article 140 of the Trade Mark Regulation, by Commission Regulation (EC)
2868/95 of 13 December 1995 Implementing Council Regulation (EC) 40/94 on the
Community Trade Mark, 1995 OJ. (L 303) 1. The claiming of priority and seniority
rights have proven to be a "difficult issue" for the CTM. Florent Gevers & David Ta-
tham, The Continuing Story of the Examination of Seniority Claims by the 019M in Alicante,
21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 228, 228 (1999). The difficulties include the requirements
of proof and other formal requirements of claiming seniority as well as the difficulty of
examination. Id. at 228-32.
177 See Trade Mark Regulation, supra note 161, art. 115, at 29 (defining language
use requirements for the CTM).
178 See id. art. 115(3), at 29 ("[T]he applicant must indicate a second language
which shall be a language of the Office the use of which he accepts as a possible lan-
guage of proceedings .... ).
See id. art. 25, at 8-9 (governing filing of applications).
ISO See id. art. 88(2), at 22 (establishing rules for representation).
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cation for completeness and for absolute grounds of refusal-for ex-
ample, lack of distinctiveness, as governed by Article 17 of the Trade
Mark Regulation. 8' This is known as the examination phase of the
registration. 2 The OHIM then searches among other CTMs for simi-
lar marks and prepares a search report for the applicant, identifying
those CTMs that might impede the registration.'83 The OHIM then
transmits a copy of the application to the national trademark offices of
the member states so that they may search their records for potentially
problematic previously registered marks.184  The results of these
searches are also transmitted to the applicant, but purely for informa-
tional purposes. No application is refused on the basis of prior con-
flicting marks.' 8 After the applicant has received the results of the
searches, she has one month to decide whether or not to move for-
ward with the application.18 6 It is in the applicant's best interest not to
pursue an application for registration if there is a strong likelihood
that the mark would be denied registration on relative grounds based
on the existence of a similar prior mark; such denial can only come
about, however, pursuant to the opposition procedure discussed be-
low. In essence, it is "up to the owners of the earlier rights to initiate
proceedings for their protection," and opposition "constitutes the
only means of protection of earlier rights before the potential regis-
tration of CTM applications.""8 7
Once the one-month time period has elapsed, the OHIM pub-
lishes the CTM application in the Community Trade Mark Bulletin."s
N See id. art. 38, at 11 (providing for "[e]xamination as to absolute grounds for
refusal").
"N, See Durn, supra note 76, at 495 (describing the two-step examination proce-
dure as one that requires that the application is in order and then examines the pro-
posed mark on absolute grounds).
IS See Trade Mark Regulation, supra note 161, art. 39(1), at 11 (stating that a
search of other CTMs will be conducted).
I See id. art. 39(2), at 12 (calling for the OHIM to submit the application to each
member state for a search).
s See id. art. 39(5), at 12 (requiring the OHIM to submit search results to the ap-
plicant).
1w. See id. art. 39(6), at 12 (setting a one-month time limit for the applicant to act).
IS7 Opposition Proceedings, OAMI NEWS (OAMI, Alicante, Spain), Issue 4, 1999, at 1,
2, available at http://www.oami.eu.int/oaminews/Oani4-99.pdf. This system has been
called a system which has "achieved the worst of all worlds" as it entails the cost and
delay of a search procedure without the certainty provided by the conclusive examina-
tion accompanying the registration of a mark. Richard Jenkins, To Examine or Not to
Examine for Prior Rights in the Community Trademark Office, TRADEMARK WORLD, May
1992, at 50,53.
.u SeeTrade Mark Regulation, supra note 161, art. 40(1), at 12 (governing publica-
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Within three months of the publication of the proposed mark, those
who wish to oppose the application must file a notice of opposition.' 8
If three months pass without a notice of opposition being filed (or if
the opposition is ultimately denied), then the proposed mark is regis-
tered as a CTM for a period of ten years.' 9 If an opposition is filed,
the applicant is informed, and then a two-month "cooling off' period
ensues during which the parties involved are encouraged to resolve
their differences and reach an amicable settlement.'9 ' If such a set-
tlement is reached, the application is withdrawn and notice of the
withdrawal is published by the OHIM.
If the opposition is contested, then the case is heard by the Oppo-
sition Division of the OHIM, which is divided into twelve units, each
consisting of "three legally qualified members" of differing national-
ity.9 If the Opposition Division rejects the opposition, then the ap-
plication is registered as a CTM.194 If, however, the Opposition Divi-
sion finds that the proposed mark cannot be registered on the basis of
"likelihood of confusion" with a prior existing national or interna-
tional mark, then the application is rejected. 9 Once an application is
tion rocedures).
See id. art. 42, at 12-13 (governing requirements for filing of opposition).
190 See id. arts. 45-46, at 13 (governing registration and the duration thereof).
191 See Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and De-
signs), Questions on Opposition, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE
COMMUNrY TRADEMARK SYSTEM, 8.13, at http://www.oami.eu.int/en/faq/faq08.htm
(last modified Aug. 25, 2000) (noting that after the applicant is advised of the opposi-
tion, a two-month period commences in which both parties can contact one another to
try to make a friendly settlement). The opposition must be filed in either the first or
second language indicated by the application, but "it also must be one of the five lan-
guages" of the OHIM. Florent Gevers & David Tatham, The Opposition Procedure in the
Community Trade Mark System, 20 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 22, 25 (1998). Therefore,
applicants wishing to ensure that the opposition will be in the language of their choice
have developed a common practice: file in one of the six European Union languages
that are not languages of the OHIM (Danish, Dutch, Finnish, Greek, Portuguese, or
Swedish). This practice forces the party to file the opposition in the language selected
as the alternate language. Id.
192 See Trade Mark Regulation, supra note 161, art. 44, at 13 (setting forth with-
drawal procedures for CTMs).
193 Opposition Proceedings, supra note 187, at 2. For a more exhaustive examination
of the opposition stage, see Jochen Pagenberg, Opposition Proceedings for the Community
Trademark-New Strategies in Trademark Law, 29 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT
L. 406 (1998).
194 See Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and De-
signs), General Questions, FREQUENTLYASKED QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE COMMUNITY
TRADEMARK SYSTEM, 1.9, at http://www.oami.eu.int/en/faq/faq0l.htm (last modified
Aug. 25, 2000) ("Where the outcome of opposition proceedings is positive for the ap-
plicant... the CTM will be registered.").
195 Opposition Proceedings, supra note 187, at 2.
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rejected, the applicant has the option of having the application con-
verted into national trademark applications for any member states in
which the holder of the prior mark does not have priority.9
Once a CTM is registered, it may still be subject to revocation or
invalidity proceedings. If, for example, a rightful trademark holder
initially fails to file an opposition, but later asserts her rights, then the
Cancellation Division of the OHIM can declare the CTM invalid. 197
This means that a CTM rarely becomes incontestable.'" The Cancel-
lation Division may also revoke a registration if the CTM is abandoned
through non-use or if the mark has "become the common name in
the trade for a product or service."'
If the applicant or CTM holder who has received an unfavorable
decision from the Opposition Division or Cancellation Division wishes
to contest that ruling, she can claim a right to an appeal.200 The three-
member Board of Appeals is empowered to "exercise any power
within the competence of the department which was responsible for
the decision appealed,"2°1' and its decisions are binding upon those
departments.2 ' If another unfavorable decision is received from the
Board of Appeals, the applicant or CTM holder can claim a further
right to appeal to the ECJ. 
3
Once a CTM has been registered, the proprietor of the CTM can
enforce his rights in special CTM courts, which are to be established
214
in each member state of the European Union. These "Community
Trade Mark Courts" will also have exclusive jurisdiction to hear ac-
V-, See Trade Mark Regulation, supra note 161, art. 108, at 27 (governing requests
for the application of national procedure). These applications will have the benefit of
any priority or seniority claimed in the CTM application. See id. art. 108(3), at 27.See id. art. 51, at 15 (setting forth the absolute grounds for invalidity); id. art. 52,
at 15 (setting forth the relative grounds for invalidity); id. art. 129, at 32 (establishing
the Cancellation Division).
1,. If the prior mark holder knowingly acquiesced in the use of the GrlTM for a pe-
riod of five successive years, she cannot then contest the claim. See id. art. 53, at 15
(announcing a limitation in consequence of acquiescence).
'" Id. art. 50, at 14.
See id. arts. 57-63, at 17-18 (governing qualifing criteria and procedure for ap-
peals).
Id. art. 62(1), at 17.
See id. art. 63(2), at 18 (setting forth the possible grounds for actions brought
before the ECJ against decisions of the Board of Appeals).
""' See id. art. 63(1), at 18 (noting that actions "may be brought before the Court of
Justice against decisions of the Boards of Appeal on appeals").
•."' See id. arts. 91-92, at 23-24 (mandating the creation of "Community Trade Mark
courts," which will have exclusive jurisdiction for all infringement actions regarding
CTMs).
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tions for declarations of noninfringement, invalidity, or revocation. °
The Trade Mark Regulation also has provisions setting forth the
"Powers of the [OHIM] President,"0 6 setting CTM costs,"' and provid-
ing for the adoption of an "Implementing Regulation" to set the CTM
system in motion.08 As demonstrated by the preceding discussion, the
Trade Mark Regulation is broader in scope and significantly more de-
tailed than the Trade Mark Directive.
C. The CTM in Practice: Early Returns, Early Con cerns
The CTM has proven to be enormously popular, and the number
of CTM applications exceeded all projections from the moment regis-
tration became possible in early 1996.'09 The bulk of these applica-
tions have come from the European Union (61%), although a signifi-
cant number of applications have been filed by American trademark
holders (28%) .2,0 For the first two years, fully a quarter of the applica-
tions were based on claims of seniority, although that rate has fallen to
about 10%."1 It takes about seven months "on average from filing to
publication of the application."
212
Approximately 18.6% of the applications filed have been op-
posed,"3 and in 60% of the cases in which the application was subject
205 See id. art. 92, at 24 (governing jurisdiction of Community Trade Mark Courts
over infringement and validity).
206 Id. art. 119, at30.
207 See id. arts. 81-82, at 21 (governing costs associated with the CTM system).
208 See id. art. 140, at 33 (establishing European Community implementing provi-
sions).
209 See Editorial, OAMI NEWS (OAMI, Alicante, Spain), Issue 5, 1998, at 1, 1, avail-
able at http://www.oami.eu.int/oaminews/Oami5-98.pdf (noting that by the beginning
of 1998, there was a backlog of 86,000 applications in the CIM office and this "impres-
sive number of Community trade mark applications ... demonstrates clearly that the
Community trade mark System meets a real need from industry"). Apparently, 46,000
applications quickly poured in during 1996, while "only 15,000 applications were ex-
pected." Stathis Koutsochinas, Jurisdiction and Procedure in Legal Actions Relating to Com-
muntit Trade Marks, 115 TRADEMARKWORLD 31, 31 n.1 (1997).
See Statistics (Situation at the Beginning of October 1999), OAMI NEws (OAMI, Ali-
cante, Spain), Issue 5, at 3, 3, available at http://www.oami.eu.int/oaminews/Oami5-
99.pdf (providing statistics showing the percentages of CTM applications by country).
21 See Gevers & Tatham, supra note 176, at 228 (noting the percentage of applica-
tions based on claims of seniority). Gevers and Tatham report that some commenta-
tors assign responsibility for the "avalanche of applications" in the first months of 1996
to the rush to register seniority claims. Id.
212 OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET (TRADE MARKS AND
DESIGNS), ANNUAL REPORT: 1998, § 1.1 (1999) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT: 1998].
213 See Opposition Proceedings, supra note 187, at 2 (discussing the benefits, grounds,
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214to opposition proceedings, the opposition was rejected . English was
the language of the opposition proceedings in the vast majority of the
cases (77%), followed by German (11%) and French (6%). 2 '5 Ap-
proximately 40% of the oppositions were settled during the "cooling
211off' period before any opposition proceedings could be held . More
than 800 decisions of the Opposition Division have been appealed to
the Board of Appeals, of which almost 700 are still pending.217 Over
60% of the decisions rendered by the Board of Appeals confirmed the
ruling of the Opposition Division. 218 As of May 2000, two decisions of
the Board of Appeals had been appealed to the Court of First Instance
of the ECJ, where the decision of the Board of Appeals was annulled
in one case,21 and upheld in the other.222
Fewer than 60 requests for cancellation have been made, and only
221
2 of those have resulted in a decision by the Cancellation Division.
As of yet, there have been no infringement proceedings published by
any of the CTM Courts. The OHIM has been able to generate reve-
nues in excess of its budget, largely due to the receipt of a large num-
ber of application, registration, and opposition fees. 22 It is still early
in the life of the CTM, but thus far, it is safe to say that the introduc-
tion of the CTM as a unitary trademark system governing the Euro-
pean Union has been a success.
Some commentators, however, have expressed certain concerns
about the CTM. Perhaps the most far-reaching concern arises out of
the right granted to parties to appeal the decision of the Board of Ap-
peals to the courts of the ECJ.2 The OHIM estimates that "more than
and procedures for opposition proceedings).
214 Id.
15 Id.
216 Id.
47 See Statistics (Situation at the Beginning of October 1999), supra note 210, at 3.
19 ANNUTAL REPORT: 1998, supra note 212, at § 2 (noting that 45 out of 70 decided
cases had been confirmed).
21 See Case T-163/98, Procter & Gamble Co. v. Office for Harmonisation in the
Internal Mkt. (Trade Mark and Designs) (OHIM), 1999 E.C.R. 107, available at
http://www.europa.eu.int (annulling the decision of the Board of Appeals).
See Case T-19/99, DKV Deutsche Krankenversicherung AG v. Office for Har-
monisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade Mark and Designs) (OHIM), 2000 E.C.R. 102,
available at http://wwv.europa.eu.int (upholding the decision of the Board of Ap-
peals).
21 See ANNUAL REPORT: 1998, supra note 212, at § 2.
See id. § 7.4 (reporting that the 1998 budget was EUR 68,529,200, and 1998
revenues amounted to EUR 68,741,221).
22 See Koutsochinas, supra note 209, at 31 (noting that Article 63 of the Trade
Mark Regulation provides that actions may be "brought before the ECJ against deci-
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400 actions" of such appeal will be brought before the Court of First
Instance annually, a workload that "could exhaust the CFI's capaci-
,,224ties. Eventually, this daunting workload would work its way to the
ECJ itself, and this "load of cases may prove to be unbearable for the
Community courts."" 5 In effect, the Trade Mark Regulation may have
turned the ECJ into a Community Trade Mark Court. Perhaps at
some point, the ECJ will need to institute an independent specialized
court, similar to the Federal Circuit in the United States, to deal ex-
clusively with CTM issues.
Another concern arises out of the fact that the Community Trade
Mark Courts established in each member state are, in essence, na-
tional courts, and it is certain that differences in interpretation of the
226terms of the Trade Mark Regulation will arise. This problem may
eventually resolve itself as the ECJ is set as the final interpreter of the
provisions of the Trade Mark Regulation, but those who look at the
Sabel v. Puma case as a decision that "lack[s] clarity," fear that "na-
tional courts will continue to find ways of determining cases in the way
in which they have previously. 2 2 7 Only upon the first round of deci-
sions by Community Trade Mark Courts in infringement proceedings,
and subsequent scholarly analysis of those results, will it be clear
whether this concern materializes.
Another unanswered question asks what the nature of the rela-
tionship will be between the protection afforded to the CTMs and the
protection afforded to the various national trademarks that will con-
tinue to exist. In addition, it remains to be seen how the Community
Trade Mark Courts will treat these two separate systems. Because the
Community Trade Mark Courts are, in essence, national courts, it is
possible that they will treat the rights conferred by the CTM in a dif-
ferent manner than those rights acquired by the registration of a na-
tional trademark. Many commentators are therefore advising that na-
tional marks not be allowed to lapse even after the registration of a
228CTM for the same sign. If this becomes a widespread or perpetual
sions of the Board of Appeals on appeals).
24 Id. at 32.
225 Id.
226 See id. at 34 (arguing that the Benelux courts will be seen as more favorable to
the GTM owner than the United Kingdom courts, with regards to the scope of rights
granted by Article 9(1) (b) of the Trade Mark Regulation, because of the former's
more expansive national interpretation of likelihood of association).
227 Id.
228 See, e.g., Gevers & Tatham, supra note 176, at 233 ("[I1]t is the authors' sugges-
tion that one should... wait at least two years after the registration of the (TM before
allowing the national mark to lapse."). A main concern driving this suggestion is the
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practice, the intrinsic value of the CTM will be undercut. Related to
this concern, the planned expansion of the European Union presents
unique questions as the national trademark systems of individual na-
tions like Estonia and the Czech Republic would have to be integrated
into the CTM system.2 4
Notwithstanding these reservations, the first three years of prac-
tice with the CTM have established not only its popularity, but also its
promise in the world of trademark protection. It can be fairly confi-
dently stated that the CTM is the most important development in
231trademark practice in the late twentieth century.
V. THE CTM AS A MODEL
The establishment of unitary trademark protection throughout
the European Union provides us with a valuable model to study for
several reasons: first, the European Union is a significant economic
market;231 second, it encompasses both common law and civil law sys-
tems;2" third, it is multilingual;.. and finally, it joins countries that
have a history of political and economic strife.m The obstacles faced
threat of cancellation or invalidation that accompanies registering the CTM. See id.
(describing the CTM cancellation procedure and arguing that "two years seems a rea-
sonable period to wait and see if anyone" begins a cancellation proceeding).
22 See EU Enlargement: Concerns on Trade Mark Rights, European Report, Feb. 26,
2000, No. 2478 (arguing that the national prior rights in the enlargement countries
should be respected, even though this may lead to problems unless the national prior
right is blocked so that it cannot extend to a GTM if it conflicts with prior CTM rights);
see also EU Enlargement: Negotiations Resume with First Wave Candidates, European Report,
Apr. 5, 2000, No. 2489 (discussing how the "Luxembourg Six" (Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus) will integrate into the CTM system).
1: Gert Wurtenberger, Determination of Risk of Confusion in Trade Mark Infringement
Proceedings in the European Union, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 302, 306 (1994).
i See Tessensohn, supra note 108, at 220 (reporting that the European Union has
370 million consumers and, together with the United States, accounts for "nearly half
the goods and services produced in the entire world").
-! Professor Kenneth Port has suggested that one of the largest obstacles in creat-
ing a worldwide harmonization of trademark law is the difference between civil law
and common law understandings about the nature of trademark rights. Port, supra
note 9, at 38-39. Professor Port speaks even more broadly to the clash of "legal cul-
tures" that harmonization foretells. Id. The European Union offers a prime chance to
obser e this interaction as the common law systems of the United Kingdom will have to
coincide with the continental civil law systems.
V 3 There are eleven official languages of the European Union, see DINWOODIE, su-
pra note 167, at 1680 (listing the official languages of the European Union), and other
"semi-official" languages (like Irish Gaelic), id. at 1689.
2M One need not have too great a grasp on history to appreciate that tremendous
rifts have historically existed between France, England, Germany, Spain, and other
member states of the European Union.
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by the European Union are surely going to be present in any effort at
creating a unitary transnational trademark system that encompasses
many nations.
International efforts at the harmonization of international trade-
mark law have made significant progress in establishing some substan-
tive (witness the National Treatment Principle of the Paris Conven-
tion) and procedural (witness the one filing registration procedure of
the Madrid Protocol) harmonization. However, in the European Un-
ion, harmonization, in the form of the Trade Mark Directive, was a
precursor to a fully unitary and international (if regional) system of
trademark protection. Although the verdict may still be out on the
CTM, early returns mark it as a popular and successful system for the
protection of trademarks. What lessons does the development and
enactment of the CTM offer to those who contemplate the possibility
of a worldwide unitary system of trademark registration and protec-
tion?
A. Harmonization as a Precursor to Uniflcation
Implementation of the CTM has taught us that any attempt at cre-
ating a unitary transnational trademark system must be preceded by a
substantive and procedural harmonization of the various and differing
trademark laws of the jurisdictions to be covered."5 Lessening the dif-
ferences in the national laws of the states intended to be joined in the
unitary system will weaken the incentive to create "protectionist barri-
ers to the free movement of goods and services and to distort competi-
tion, thereby undermining the single market." 6 Some of this har-
monization has already taken place in the form of the Paris
Convention and the Madrid measures. It is clear, however, that ex-
haustive procedural and substantive harmonization must occur in or-
der to set the stage for the creation of a unitary system.
Procedural harmonization must occur in much the same way it
currently is being accomplished, through the development of interna-
tional registration (like the Madrid Agreement) and application (like
the Madrid Protocol) systems, as well as a system that unifies the main-
tenance of trademark rights (like the TLT). The steps that the inter-
national community has already taken with respect to the harmoniza-
235 See supra Part IIIA (discussing harmonization); supra Part IVA (regarding pro-
cedural harmonization).
26 Completing the Internal Market; Intellectual Property; Current Position and Outlook,
INFo-92, Nov. 24, 1994, at 6.2.1, available at LEXIS, Europe Library, INF092 File.
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tion of procedural trademark law have laid the foundation for the
next step of harmonization-substantive harmonization.
Substantive harmonization has been attempted on several occa-
sions, and has most often ended in utter failure (one has only to recall
the failed efforts at substantive harmonization by the committee of
experts formulating the TLT to know how difficult this process can
be) .9 However, the Trade Mark Directive, and the way it set the stage
for the development of the unitary CTM system, provides us with an
example of how substantive harmonization can be achieved. If the
goal of a truly open market is valued highly enough, substantive har-
monization can even cut across multicultural and multilingual socie-
ties. The Trade Mark Directive also provides us with the cautionary
lesson that any effort at substantive harmonization will take time.
It must be remembered that the first group met to discuss the es-
tablishment of a CTM in 1964, the Trade Mark Directive was not ap-
proved until 1988, and the CTM system was not in place until nearly a
decade after that. In addition, the time frame for adherence to the
Trade Mark Directive was extended once it became clear that the
member states were not going to have their laws reformed to meet the
deadline, and even then, not all of the countries met the revised dead-
line.2 This thirty-year time frame must be kept in mind by any who
contemplate the creation of a unitary trademark system.
B. Consolidation to Create a Unitary System
After a harmonization effort has served to greatly narrow the gap
between, and make substantially similar, the laws of the states in ques-
tion, the creation of a unitary transnational trademark system will re-
quire the creation of a consolidated legislative, administrative, and ju-
dicial framework that can serve to manage the new unitary trademark.
The experience in the European Union with the creation and devel-
opment of the CTM is a valuable precedent to study, as it has given us
a glimpse of the difficulties and obstacles that must be overcome in
creating the necessary framework to administer the system.
The first element that must be present is some manner of legisla-
tive body that has the representational authority and competence to
i_17 A severe substantive obstacle to the creation of a harmonized set of trademark
laws will be the widely variant economic realities of the different countries party to any
agreement. As it has been noted, "[a] ttitudes toward intellectual property tend to dif-
fer greatly between those countries that import intellectual property and those that
export it." Morgan, supra note 7, at 797.
Y'm Refer to supra Part IIA for a more comprehensive treatment of this process.
2000]
350 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV1EW [Vol. 149:309
establish regulations for the unitary system. Such a legislative body is
necessary to escape the narrow justificatory bounds of nationalistic
territoriality for the exercise of law.
Through the Treaty of Rome, member states of the European Un-
ion have, through representation in the European Council, bestowed
representational legitimacy upon the directives and pronouncements
of the Union. As the heated debate on the adoption of the substan-
tive measures of the Trade Mark Directive illustrates, such representa-
tion ensures that each country governed by the final legislation has a
voice in its enactment. Any worldwide system would need to originate
in a political body that has similar representational legitimacy.
The WIPO already exists within the structure of the United Na-
tions as a body that deals with intellectual property matters on a na-
tional level. Perhaps substantive measures of trademark law harmoni-
zation can spring from this (or a similar) body.219  The limited
legislative nature of the WIPO, however, may not be sufficient to es-
tablish the requisite representational authority. The very creation of a
body to represent the diverse needs and interests of the various coun-
tries is difficult to envision, but it is vital to any effort to create a uni-
tary transnational system.
Once a legislative body is in place, an executive or administrative
body will be necessary to manage the unitary trademark system. Cre-
ating this administrative body will prove to be difficult. The OHIM in
Alicante, the body that administers the CTM, required years of debate
and the overcoming of repeated stalemates to establish.2 40 In a world-
wide setting, the difficulties in choosing an appropriate place for the
headquarters (in a national setting, perhaps deciding on an appropri-
ate set of places for regional headquarters) will prove to be exceed-
ingly difficult, as the location of the office will bring jobs, visibility,
and perhaps some level of authority to the territory selected (a key
reason why Spain lobbied so hard to be the locale for OHIM). In ad-
239 One may note that the WIPO was the body largely responsible for promoting
the changes introduced by the TLT and, more recently, in the TRIPS agreement.
These "treaties," however, bind only member countries that chose to "sign on." What I
am envisioning is legislation in the more classic sense-a negotiated law passed by a
majority and then enforced against all parties represented in the body. The proper
model for this is the passage of the Trade Mark Directive in the European Union. The
failure of the WIPO to accomplish any substantive reform of international trademark
law is evidenced by the failure of the substantive negotiations of the TLT. See supra
Part II.E (discussing the terms and purposes of the TLT).
240 For a discussion of the political and procedural difficulties overcome while es-
tablishing the OHIM, see supra Part IVA.
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dition, although the OHIM has thus far taken in enough revenues to
meet its budget, it could prove to be quite expensive to open and op-
erate an administrative system that must be able to deal with a number
of languages and have relations with many national trademark offices.
The next, and most important, element in any endeavor to create
a unitary international trademark system is the creation of a hierar-
chical judicial system that can both successfully administer and con-
clusively interpret any harmonization legislation. This judicial system
would have the dual tasks of maintaining the balance of power in the
community and guaranteeing uniform application of the community
law. V' The judges presiding in this judicial system, in order to carry
out these tasks, will have to be carefully chosen for their political in-
dependence.242
Even a fully harmonized, unified law, when left in the hands of
different national courts, can be interpreted in various ways according
to the "economic and social contexts" of the different nations.4 To
reconcile these inevitable conflicts, a system of appeals, which will
culminate in a supreme trademark court that has the authority to
make final and binding interpretations of the relevant trademark law
harmonizing statute, is necessitated. The ECJ provides this function
for the European Union with respect to the CTM, and time will tell
whether or not the judgments of the ECJ serve to "harmonize" the in-
terpretation of trademark law in Europe. If it is successful in doing so,
then, as a model, it may be exportable to a worldwide setting (al-
though it remains unclear what body could serve as the final arbiter
and interpreter of trademark issues as there is no world court of jus-
tice so situated at present).
Another key component to the establishment of the legislative,
administrative, and especially the judicial institutions necessary for
managing a unitary transnational system of trademark protection is
the way in which those appealing to the system are perceived. For ex-
ample, the idea that Community law in the European Union "consti-
tutes a legal system of a new kind that recognizes as its subject, not
only the Member States, but also their citizens," 2 is an essential con-
!A1 See Paolo Mengozzi, The Protection of Individual Rights and the Court of First Instance
of the European Communities, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 707, 711 (2000) (noting that the
Court of First Instance of the European Community performs those functions for the
European Union).
See id. at 710 (noting that the judges applying Community law in the European
Union are chosen for their political independence).
24 Dinwoodie, supra note 1, at 9.
;1 Mengozzi, supra note 241, at 709.
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cept in ensuring that each petitioner to the system is treated equally
and is viewed as a citizen of the European Union rather than merely
as a national of the country where the petitioner resides. Likewise, a
transnational trademark system would be greatly aided if the adminis-
trative and judicial bodies of that system were able to consider those
before it as "world citizens" rather than as nationals of a particular
country. This would help ensure that all people subject to the system
would be treated fairly, regardless of their nationality or the relative
strength of their country's economy. More importantly, it would help
ensure that those subject to the system would be confident in placing
their trust in the protection offered by the system. Realistically, how-
ever, the concept of world citizenship is a broad and demanding one
that perhaps no governmental body is fully able to successfully em-
brace at this time.
C. Greater Difficulties
However, even if a worldwide system were to satisfy the need for
representational legitimacy, pass a substantive and unitary trademark
law, and devise a procedural system which fairly and efficiently allo-
cates trademark rights, as well as a judicial system to conclusively and
fairly apply that law, it would still face nearly insurmountable adminis-
trative obstacles that would jeopardize the creation of a unitary system
for the protection of trademarks. The implementation of the admin-
istrative apparatus necessitated by such a system would provide nu-
merous political difficulties: where to center an administrative office;
what language to operate in; with whom to staff the operation; and
many others.24' There is also the very real danger of "cultural expan-
sionism" which would be inherent in any system seeking to apply "one
trademark law ... equally and consistently around the world" and the
concurrent danger that this would pose to world diversity. 246 Some be-
245 Recall the difficulties which delayed the implementation of the Trade Mark
Regulation in Europe. The political obstacles faced there would be much more diffi-
cult to overcome in a worldwide setting. See Leaffer, supra note 6, at 29 (stating that
"[t] here are simply too many irreconcilable differences in language, legal culture, and
judicial systems among nations" for there to be unification of trademark law "in the
strict sense").
246 See Port, supra note 9, at 42-43 (arguing that harmonizing substantive trademark
law and its application would necessarily require a choice about the correct legal cul-
ture, and that any answer to that question would create the danger of a less diverse and
interesting world); see also Backer, supra note 12, at 200, 209 (arguing that the power of
centrality, enforced through the courts, invests the transnational authority with the
power (and the responsibility) to settle values and cultural conflicts without regard to
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lieve that in a world of unequal power, harmonization through inter-
national bodies "provides a vehicle for the imposition of the norms of
dominant states on those with less power," and therefore, "harmoniza-
tion can be considered the ultimate act of subordination."247 This is
certainly an issue to be considered when a transnational system of
trademark protection (or any transnational system of law, for that
matter) is contemplated.
Another difficulty presents itself in that the substance of any bind-
ing supranational legislation may also have to be cut out of whole
cloth as the Trade Mark Regulation provides a model that will proba-
bly not be feasible in the international setting. The European Union
has created a system where national trademark rights and Community
trade mark rights coexist (how peacefully remains to be seen). As dis-
cussed in Part IV.C, this coexistence has the potential of undercutting
the entire unitary system of trademark protection. The European Un-
ion also "empowers" national rights in that a prior national right can
invalidate a Community right-a problem encountered by a signifi-
cant number of CTM applications. In a worldwide setting, the ability
to find a mark or sign, which has no priority or seniority claim any-
where else in the world, will be greatly circumscribed by the vast num-
ber of registered (and valid unregistered) national marks. One could
argue that allowing a "cooling off' period, such as the very successful
one incorporated by the European Union in the Trade Mark Regula-
tion, would allow the market to correctly allocate the rights to the
marks in the world product and service market. This argument is
largely speculative, however, and in the end favors those proprietors
from wealthy and developed nations.
The tremendous difficulties (practical, theoretical, and moral)
facing any attempt at the worldwide harmonization of trademark law
and the creation of a unitary system of trademark protection are
probably prohibitive. I believe, however, that the developments in the
CTM system in the European Union should be closely followed and
critically studied. The CTM is a monumental step forward in creating
a unitary system of protection that bridges many of the cultural, lin-
gual, economic, and systemic divergences that have separated the
countries of Europe for centuries. Its success or failure will hold many
lessons for those who harbor the possibility of a system of unitary
worldwide trademark protection.
the "state" or local entity and its unique culture and customs, a centralizing force
which will "destroy the essence of those cultures").
:47 Backer, supra note 12, at 213.
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CONCLUSION
Although the difficulties facing any effort at the creation of a
worldwide system for the unitary transnational protection of trade-
mark rights may seem daunting (and even prohibitive), the same
could have been said thirty years ago about the possibility of creating a
unitary trademark system that would govern the countries of Europe.
The development of the CTM in the European Union establishes that
it is possible to create a unitary transnational trademark system, but
cautions that any similar effort would be slow moving and resource in-
tensive, and would demand numerous political, economic, and philo-
sophical compromises. A close study of how the CTM is implemented
and the success (or lack thereof) that it achieves is in order. Such a
study would be invaluable to scholars, practitioners, governments, and
international organizations that have an interest in developing further
comprehensive harmonization, or even unification, of international
trademark law.
